

JPRS 78976

15 September 1981

West Europe Report

No. 1815



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

15 September 1981

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1815

CONTENTS

THEATER FORCES

BELGIUM

- Communist Leader Hits U.S. Policy on ERW, TNF
(Claude Renard; LE SOIR, 22 Aug 81)..... 1

TERRORISM

GREECE

- Fire-Bombing Incidents Analyzed
(Ilias Malatos; EPIKAIRA, 16-22 Jul 81)..... 3

ENERGY ECONOMICS

GREECE

- Country Reportedly Has Sufficient Storage for Petroleum
(I KATHIMERINI, 25 Aug 81)..... 7

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

- CFP's Energy Activities, Future Reviewed in Detail
(Pierre Pean; LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, 10 Aug 81)..... 8

GREECE

Monetary, Technical Assistance for Farmers Planned
(Vas. Tsiounis Interview; O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, 6 Aug 81).. 19

Aluminum Production Status Reported
(O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, 6 Aug 81) 22

POLITICAL

FRANCE

Hermier on PCF, PS Relations; Eurocommunism, Working Class
(Guy Hermier Interview; RINASCITA, 24 Jul 81)..... 24

PS Editor on Policy, Factions; PCI, EC, PCF Relations
(Claude Estier Interview; RINASCITA, 24 Jul 81)..... 30

GREECE

Presumed Dates for General Elections
(EPIKAIRA, 16-22 Jul 81)..... 41

PASOK Labor Union Policy Analyzed
(Miltiadis Evert; I VRADYNI, 12 Aug 81)..... 44

SPAIN

Carrillo Criticized for Personalizing Party Differences
(Cesar Alonso de los Rios; LA CALLE, 28 Jul-3 Aug 81)..... 47

PCE Regional Conference Legitimizes Factional Views
(Carlos Elordi; LA CALLE, 21-27 Jul 81)..... 51

Eurocommunist Analysis of PCE as Congress Approaches
(Carlos Alonso Zaldivar; LA CALLE, 28 Jul-3 Aug 81)..... 56

UCD-PSOE Agreement on Autonomies Criticized by PCE Organ
(Manuel Torres; MUNDO OBRERO, 14-20 Aug 81)..... 59

GENERAL

GREECE

Romanian Education Minister Reports on Foreign Students
(Ilias Malatos; EPIKAIRA, 9-15 Jul 81)..... 62

ITALY

Confusion at Top Blamed for Slowing Down Space Program (Iginio Coggi; AVIAZIONE, Jul-Aug 81).....	64
Present, Future of Solid Propellant Industry (Paolo Laurienzo; RIVISTA AERONAUTICA, Jul-Aug 81).....	68

COMMUNIST LEADER HITS U.S. POLICY ON ERW, TNF

Brussels LE SOIR in French 22 Aug 81 pp 1,3

[Commentary by Claude Renard, vice president of the PCB [Belgium Communist Party]:
"Stop the Race Toward the Abyss"]

[Text] There is certainly a relationship between the United States decision to produce the neutron bomb and the proposal to meet which President Reagan later addressed to his Soviet counterpart. This proposal was undoubtedly aimed at reducing the criticism generated by an initiative which, if pursued, would produce a catastrophic worsening of the arms race. In any case, it shows that the Reagan administration cannot afford the luxury of turning its back indefinitely on the offers to negotiate, which Moscow has been repeating insistently for numerous months. However, it must be recognized that this proposal was made in a political context which greatly reduces its credibility.

International relations being what they are, the search for strong positions, if not positions of strength, always has a tendency to take the upper hand, even when the governments would like to negotiate. But the American decision to produce the neutron bomb clearly goes beyond that.

The United States is already in a position of strength in the area of intercontinental missiles as well as in that of medium range missiles. By blocking the SALT II agreements, they have deliberately put a stop to a balancing upwards of the strategic arms which exist on both sides. Their choice was clear: it was the choice of confrontation and escalation. As for the Euro-missiles, we are not unaware of the fact that the "Poseidon" missiles, which American submarines in European waters are equipped with, could easily reach Soviet territory, where the famous SS-20 has been deployed only as a response to this threat. Hence, the increased pressures from Washington for the establishment of "Cruise" and "Pershing II" bases on European soil, are part of the same policy of confrontation and escalation.

What President Reagan is actually seeking is not, following the unfortunately common practice, a stronger position to negotiate under favorable conditions, but the absolute supremacy of the military might of the United States. The desire to establish this supremacy explains all the major options taken by the Reagan administration, in terms of strategic nuclear arms as well as with regard to the proliferation of tactical weapons. All of this within the framework of a gigantic program of increasing military spending and of aggressive displays such as those which recently took place in the Mediterranean.

Now, the weakness of this desire for supremacy lies primarily in its lack of realism. Why would it have a better chance of being successful today than at the time when the United States had a monopoly on the atom bomb? And especially, what sense could the notion of military supremacy still have for a state which, if it had to make use of it, would nonetheless condemn itself to the holocaust?

At the present time, 55 thousand nuclear warheads have been accumulated all over the world. The most elementary common sense demands that, instead of adding neutron warheads, in addition to the "Cruise" and the "Pershing II" missiles proposed to Europe, negotiations be initiated quickly on the limitation and reduction of /all/ [in italics] nuclear arms. Because the only alternative these days is to stop the arms race or to render the planet uninhabitable even before managing to destroy all civilized life on it.

Europe, and more specifically the small European states, have a vital interest in intervening to bring about such negotiations. Furthermore, the neutron bomb appears to be a weapon designed for them. Let us say that it is a bomb specifically conceived for the Federal Republic of Germany and for Benelux.

As a matter of fact, we have reached the point where the need to react firmly should transcend a great many ideological differences. If one day the Soviet SS-20 were to swoop down on Belgium would it make a selection among its victims? Would it set aside the people available for a change of regime?

One may also assume that by virtue of the law of large numbers, the American neutron bomb -- which has the peculiar characteristic of killing people while preserving property -- would exterminate many more Soviet soldiers than bank administrators. But would this comfort anyone at the Societe Generale?

Hence it really is a question of life and death. Public opinion as a whole owes it to itself to react against the race toward the abyss.

8463

CSO: 3100/921

FIRE-BOMBING INCIDENTS ANALYZED

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 16-22 Jul 81 pp 22-23

[Article by Ilias Malatos]

[Text] In the first place, the fires at the two large department stores, of Dragonas in Athens and of Lambropoulos in Piraeus, have ushered in a new tactic in the activity of the terrorist groups, and secondly they have exhausted the police in their investigations to track down the mystery surrounding these incendiary attacks.

The change in tactics by the terrorists appeared so suddenly that for a quarter of an hour, as the flames embraced the multistoried building of Lambropoulos, nobody was talking about arson and bombs.

But the news about the conflagration at the Dragona department store as well gave the signal for a general mobilization of the fire department and the police, because now everybody had been persuaded that they were dealing with bombs and acts of arson. And although the battle to extinguish the fire at the store of Dragonas was won within an hour, this was not the case for the building of Lambropoulos, where the flames had a head start of a few minutes over the firemen.

When in Piraeus the first firemen arrived at the Lambropoulou building at 1600 hours on Tuesday afternoon, they were faced with a tragic scene. The flames had surrounded the building, while at the same time three people on the flat roof of the building were in danger of being burned alive. They were the manager of the department store, Spiros Fiorendinos, and the employees Evthymios Boumelis and G. Spyridakis. They were saved by the firemen, who got them down in time from the roof.

But these were not the only people who were endangered by the latest acts of arson. On the eighth floor, in the accounts office of the firm, there were in addition the women Eirini Oreli, Despoina Kouki, Dora Dipla, Tzeni Tsopanaki, who is 6 months pregnant, Niki Georgaka, and the guard Ilias Patsikeas. At the risk of their lives, these people managed to descend and get out of the burning building.

A quarter of an hour after the conflagration at the store of Lambropoulos, the firemen joined battle also at the store of Dragonas on Aioulou Street. And here four people were in danger. G. Dragonas himself was there on the eighth floor. In addition there were the employees Anna Skrombola, Evangelia Sakellaropoulou, and Vaso Tsakla.

The smoke from the second floor of the Dragona building betrayed the fire to the people who were on the eighth floor. These rushed to it and with fire extinguishers struggled to extinguish it. Although not able to succeed in extinguishing the fire, they were able to limit it and even to notify the fire department in time. Thus Dragonas and the three women risked their lives, but they saved the building from complete destruction.

Simple Mechanisms, Great Damage

For the first time--following the acts of arson on the Minion, Katrandzos, Atene, and Klaoudatos stores--the police were able to find the improvised incendiary mechanisms almost intact. One was found on the second floor of the store of Dragonas and the other on the third floor of the building of Lambropoulos.

These were simple mechanisms which consisted of two parts. One is a pack of cigarettes containing a battery and a wristwatch, and outside the pack is a flashbulb. The other part is a nylon bag containing gasoline (the police estimate the amount of gasoline at 1 1/2 kilograms), and a bundle of match heads.

The arsonist has fixed the watch to produce the combustion. Earlier he has removed the minute hand and has let the hour hand continue to function. He has made a hole in the dial of the watch at the point corresponding to the time when he "desires" the combustion to happen, and through the hole he made there he passes the battery wires. As soon as the hour hand reaches the hole, it closes the circuit with the wire and the small bulb which is outside the pack lights up. At the same time, from the bulb the matches which are glued to it catch fire. And next the gasoline is ignited.

The only positive evidence which the discovery of the mechanisms gave to the police was the fact that these mechanisms confirmed their opinion that the terrorists were using makeshift bombs and not laser beams or some other mysterious material! And in addition they confirmed their allegation that these fire-bombing terrorists belong to that group which has used such mechanisms to set fire to automobiles in the past.

And even before the incendiary mechanisms were found, an official announcement was issued by authorities about these acts of arson, in which it was written, among other things:

"Today's criminal action against the stores 'Dragona' and 'Lambropoulou' is the work of the same circle of criminals who took action last December and in May of this year against the stores 'Minion,' 'Katrandzos,' 'Atene,' and 'Klaoudatos.'

"The police authorities have well-founded suspicions as to the perpetrators, but the circumstantial evidence which exists cannot constitute a proof of their guilt."

The tenor of the second paragraph of this announcement is distinctive for its eccentricity! In any case, the police do not claim the authorship of this announcement.

Some 72 hours after these acts of arson, and while the police investigation measures involving checks and searches within the large stores of the capital and Piraeus had been stepped up, an unknown person placed a composite mechanism--

that is, a mechanism both explosive and incendiary--on the fifth floor at the Lambropoulos stores in Athens. The guard Stavros Orfanidis found it in the check which he was making during the midday break. This too was inside a pack of cigarettes and contained gunpowder and gasoline!

The police said that this bomb would not have exploded, because the hour hand of the watch had become stuck to insulating tape which the unknown person had placed on the dial of the watch! And again the authorities hastened to issue an announcement, which stressed that "this bomb was put there to cause anxiety." And does not the affront caused by the unknown perpetrator of ignoring so many checks and of venturing to transport and place this bomb make any difference to the authorities?

Mutual Accusations, and the Offer of a Reward

The losses to the two stores are very great. At the store of Lambropoulos the third, fourth, and fifth floors were destroyed, while the first, second, sixth, and seventh floors have sustained serious damage. At the Dragonas store, the second and third floors suffered great damage, but the other floors suffered less damage from the water used by the fire department.

And here is a characteristic point: On the day of the arsons, a decision was published in the EFIMERIS TIS KYVERNISEOS [Official Gazette] on granting a guarantee from the State to the National Bank of Greece to cover the financing of 60 million drachmas to the Minion firm.

Again the police searches have not yielded anything certain up to now. The bringing forward of suspects has been limited this time, since these had been gone through completely in the inquiries on the Atene and Kilaoudatos arsons on 3 June.

Now by their activity the terrorists have mobilized all the security forces of Athens, Piraeus, and the suburbs gendarmery. And this is because 24 hours before the acts of arson at the two stores took place, other unknown persons placed fire bombs in the dressing rooms of the bathing beach "Asteria" in Glyfada.

Following the acts of arson on the two stores, the unknown persons involved in the bathing-beach action hastened to circulate a proclamation that they assumed responsibility for this action. These people are associated with the group "Revolutionary Left." The fact is distinctive that in its proclamation the "Revolutionary Left" "defends" its attack on the bathing beach by writing that "it is there that the bourgeoisie and the Americans seek admission tickets and go bathing," while launching an open attack against the arsonists of the stores. And these people write that their own attack "under no circumstances should be identified with mistaken practices such as that of 'October 80' (arson of the Minion-Katrandzos), which in being based on a vague theory about needs, serve to glorify destruction, strengthen in the minds of the people certain ideas about exploitative private property instead of leading them to question this, make the people passive by creating a spectacle and passive spectators, and incite the movement of revolutionary violence, thus giving the State the privilege of supposedly feeling compassion for and helping out the workers whom the acts of arson have cast out into the street...."

This is an open attack, which the police are trying to turn to good account, but without any positive results up to now.

But it is not only the mutual accusations of the autonomous anarchists which the police are trying to make use of. There is also the reward for the capture of the arsonists, set at 20 million drachmas, which has been offered since last December in connection with the Minion and Katrandzos burnings. And already 7 months have passed without any results.

12114

CSO: 4621/41

COUNTRY REPORTEDLY HAS SUFFICIENT STORAGE FOR PETROLEUM

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Aug 81 p 7

[Text] Yesterday officials of the Aspropyrgos refinery emphasized that there is no problem regarding storage of oil from Thasos. This was in reference to reports published yesterday claiming that public oil storage facilities are full, posing a problem for storing the 27,000 tons of crude being delivered by the tanker "Marizina" from the "Prinos" oil wells.

The same officials stated that the rough figure of 30,000 tons to be pumped in the first phase from the Prinos deposit represents only a small percentage of consumption. Accordingly, there is no question of finding suitable storage sites. Greek petroleum will be received directly from the state refinery facilities of Aspropyrgos.

On the subject of the amount of state reserves, competent officials stated that we are on target with our commitment to set aside a 90-day emergency reserve.

Meantime, on Saturday the first Greek petroleum from the Prinos area of Thasos began to be loaded onto the Greek-flag 82,000-ton capacity tanker "Marizina" for delivery to Hellenic Refineries for further processing.

For this first loading of Greek petroleum there was a ceremony aboard the vessel that was anchored off the Nea Karvali hydrocarbon desulfurization plant on land at Kavala. In attendance were Minister of Northern Greece N. Martis and Minister of Communications Panagiotopoulos.

In his speech the minister of Northern Greece asserted: "The first phase of a grand undertaking is brought to completion today with the shipment of petroleum to Hellenic Refineries.

"Prospects are rosy and hopes are high that with the wide-ranging exploration program the government has been carrying out we will be able to discover and exploit all the oil reservoirs that our country may contain."

The next speaker was Minister of Communications Panagiotopoulos who said:

"I feel especially gratified that the people of Greece today are seeing the first oil tanker taking on Greek petroleum turned out by the Prinos plant.

"Talk and statistics afford unlimited opportunities for wrangling, arguing and demagogy.

"A fact, like the one today, leaves room only for general applause."

CFP'S ENERGY ACTIVITIES, FUTURE REVIEWED IN DETAIL

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 10 Aug 81 pp 20-25

[Article by Pierre Pean]

[Text] Acceleration in oil exploration effort, redistribution in coal, nuclear energy, and the new energy fields: CFP continues to evolve. This fall, however, the state--its principal shareholder--will define the conditions of its coexistence with Elf, the great "rival."

Total is waiting for fall. The new pilots of the state, its principal shareholder, are pondering its role. And in order not to upset them, the Old Dame is dressing herself more drably than usual. But suddenly, and to its sorrow, it has been thrown into the spotlight. Its decision to suspend purchases of Mexican crude, which it was allowed to do under its contract, showed in effect that the day-to-day management of a multinational which has for the first time passed the impressive milestone of a 100-billion [French francs] annual turnover cannot be neutral. The sharp crisis between Paris and Mexico was only the tip of the iceberg. The affair revealed the contradictions in France's oil policy and the urgency of coming up with a new and more coherent relationship. Mr Rene Granier de Lilliac, the president of CFP [French Petroleum Company], explained its responsibilities to the new government.

Absurd

"One cannot both arbitrarily hold down prices in a period of inflation and align them at the lowest level in periods of a depressed market, or else one runs the risk of seeing industry itself disappear in time," said the CFP president last 26 June. He repeated the warning to Mr Pierre Dreyfus, the new minister of industry. Its principal subsidiary, CFR, is presently "erasing" the profits it made on crude operations.

There is first of all the absurd effect of the price taxing system, and then the effects of a sudden fall in the consumption of fuel, Total's high supply costs by comparison with the competition...In order to avoid a still more dramatic hemorrhage, CFP--in unison with the commissioners of the government (and thus of Dhyca) and the Elysee's "energy" adviser--broke off buying Mexican crude--as did

the international companies--at the beginning of July. But CFP's oil purchases are only one part of a government-to-government industrial cooperation agreement. Mexico threatened... And Francois Mitterrand, who is sympathetic to the current Mexican regime, gave firm instructions to Pierre Dreyfus, the minister of industry. On 16 July, Pemex and CFP decided to resume trade in "the context of the contract, as soon as agreement on a new accord is reached." Which, in diplomatic language, means that not everything has been resolved. But Mexico has already lowered its official prices.

Mr. Granier de Lilliac went back to its two protectors, Finance and Industry, to ask for compensation based on "national duty." In July CFR was demanding 30 centimes per liter of fuel. Jacques Delors, the ministry of the economy and finance, did not want to approve such a stiff hike which would profit those whose cost of supplies is lower than CFP, particularly Esso and Mobil.

How, under these conditions, does one provide for a healthy diversification of the sources of crude, as the public authorities desire? Security costs money. The new minister of industry realizes this. So arbitration must be carried out in September to achieve a better reconciliation of profitability and security. And a new role must be defined for CFP.

What roles must Elf and CFP respectively fill in the execution of French policy? Are two distinct groups still necessary? Who will manage the 16 percent of CFP held by the nationalized banks which added to the portion held by the Treasury amounts to 51 percent?

Will the government stand by the statements of candidate Francois Mitterrand, which were precise on the subject of energy but silent as to CFP, or will it return to the socialist program, which called for 51 percent control? All these questions are becoming relatively urgent. At a time when CFP is asking Finance for a short-term loan of around Fr 4 billion. To buy crude for the second half of the year... And when this "Sleeping Beauty" of the Stock Exchange was beginning to make a splash as a dynamic industrial. In fact, with the support of CGE [General Electric Company] and a little help from the public authorities, CFP has just taken control of Doris--the French off-shore deep-drilling company, away from Bouygues. And CFP is solidifying its position among the numerous subsidiary petroleum companies.

Gamble

Transforming the company into an energy industrial was, however, a gamble. After 10 years of profound change, CFP is only halfway out of the woods, with numerous obstacles to surmount. So Total is looking for its second wind.

"The number one mission of CFP remains oil," Louis Deny, the vice president and general manager of the group, is fond of saying. But changes in French energy policy have required him to look at energy strategy as a whole, not just at oil strategy. Looking ahead to the year 1990--tomorrow, in other words--oil should only amount to about 30 percent of French energy consumption (compared to 67 percent in 1973,) or 70 to 80 million tons of oil products, as against 111.8 in

1973 and 98.5 last year. If Total were to be satisfied with its traditional mission of providing for 25 percent of France's oil needs, it would have to reduce its activity by 20 percent in 10 years. This shrinkage is a reality. The level of activity of CFR, its refinery subsidiary and the principal industrial instrument of the group, was 5.2 percent lower in 1980 than the previous year. It will drop considerably further this year. Weak prices have led it to abandon the fuel market.

The top officials of CFP, whose principal shareholder is the state with 35 percent of the capital and 40 percent of the voting rights, is working sufficiently in symbiosis with the ministry of industry for their strategy to be integrated completely with the objectives of Rue de Grenelle. And the political turnaround will serve only to reinforce that attitude. In the oil domain, CFP should supply CFR's crude requirements. And beyond that, sufficiently large supplies to provide "grosso modo" for half of French consumption (Elf-Aquitaine covering the other half). This objective, set by the 1975 government, with the aim of attenuating the effects of a possible crisis, should be reconsidered, along with that of better diversification of resources. The loss of one-third of its traditional resources (Iraq and Algeria) would pose problems in case the market reversed.

The same amount of energy but less in oil would be required to keep Total's energy supplies to the French market at a constant level (17 percent of French consumption in 1973, but around 14 percent today), so it has gone into coal. Its ambitions are very large: 20 million tons at the end of the decade, or the equivalent of 40 percent of the consumption anticipated in 1980. To do that, CFP will have to invest Fr 3 billion in the next 10 years. It is presently negotiating to augment its reserves, especially in the United States. A historical irony: in order to reconquer the French coal market, Total will among others be making use of two of its companies--Fils Charvet and the Patin Coal and Oil Company--which the group had bought when coal was down in order to broaden its "fuel" network.

Neither could the Total group stay out of the nuclear domain. It believes it should get involved in uranium production, the first link in the chain. In 1971, CFP acquired its first mine in Australia, targeted on the Japanese market. It joined PUK [Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann Company] in 1975 to create Minatome, which had the ambitious aim of controlling 5 to 6 percent of world uranium ore production by the end of the decade. The CFP share would be the equivalent of French consumption. And last, in a more modest vein, Total has also gone into solar energy.

CFP began its metamorphosis at the beginning of the last decade. Its declining access to traditional sources of crude forced it. The successive misfortunes of Iran, Iraq, and Algeria require it now to accelerate the process. In order to carry out its objectives, the French group has at its disposal some good and some bad cards.

Dramatic

Mr Rene Granier de Lilliac, a bashful and quiet miner--an unknown to the finance minister of the time, Valery Giscard d'Estaing--who has made his career in the

shade of Mr de Metz, took the helm in June 1971 of a ship which was leaking water from every seam.

After 10 years at the head of the number 1 French industrial group (in terms of turnover), number 6 in terms of capital proper, he is still an unknown to the general public. And not much better known even within his own group. Only the members of the executive board, a few managers and advisers have access to him. He is generally described as cautious, but under his reign there have been visible signs of dramatic and far-reaching changes. He does not make "Page One" of the newspapers. He is the opposite of Albin Chalandon. All the same, his interlocutors consider him a good negotiator.

Mr Louis Deny, his closest associate, the vice president-general manager of CFP, is a fighter, a team leader, a "big talker" who moreover has had to calm down since he was officially named to the position of number two. His detractors criticize his muscle-bound conservatism and his great admiration for the South African model.

Irreverence

Inside the group, which is pleased to project an image of itself as disembodied and defying personalization, the human factor has nevertheless been of decisive importance. For a quarter of a century after World War II the life of CFP was punctuated by battles launched from one side or the other at the Hotel des Demoiselles de Verriere, where the head offices of CFP and CFR are located (in Paris, 16th arrondissement), between two titans: Victor de Metz, the president of the former, and Rene Perrin, president of the latter, CFR, the big industrial arm of the group. Even today, the old enmities continue to play a deep role in the life of the Total group. Up to 1980, CFP had to endure the harsh and irreverent retorts of CFR's Perrin. This principal subsidiary's return to the ranks of the group is quite recent. It is the work of the supposedly timid president of the Total group.

Pierre Capoulade, the energetic former number two at CFR, was not, in fact, named president of the refinery as he had hoped. Granier de Lilliac opted instead for one of the CFP seraglio, Armand Guilbaud, who it was supposed would be more tractable, to take over the reins of the big French company's refinery. And, to pacify Capoulade, a large barony was built to order for him--Total Approvisionnement Raffinage Distribution Chimie--which among other things is supposed to handle coordination between the group and...CFR! A sometimes arduous task. Guilbaud, urged on by an establishment accustomed to revelling in its independence, is now fighting against the crude oil transfer fees imposed by the group and is contesting certain arbitrations between CFR and the group's foreign distribution subsidiaries. These confrontations, considered to be unavoidable, are today being resolved quietly. The continuing determination of the Total group's leadership to avoid personnel conflicts has led it to adopt a unique policy. The great CFP in reality employs only 32 people. That is to say that it has neither a joint production committee nor an employee representative. The 2,700 people employed by the head office are loaned out to two service companies, Total CFP.G (G=Management), and Total CFP (GR), headed by Guy Bizot, who is also the personnel

manager for the group. He serves as a buffer between the trade unions and the board. The trade unions are presently trying to gain acceptance for the social and economic uniformity of the enterprise and thus to do away with that "archaic" set-up. On 29 June they signed four protocols which move in that direction. The board is above all reluctant to accept an employee representative on the board of directors. Up to now it has played on employee apathy, an attitude that among other things is explained by the very high wages paid. They are on average higher than Fr 150,000 per year. Moreover, the Total "personality" is a reality. The social advantages, from the standpoint of "stylishness and taste" of the firm, and the relatively infrequent lay-offs, have had their effect on molding the various employee units of the group.

Resentment

Thrifty, the group has always been careful to finance its own activities. This is doubtless one of the reasons one finds the public resentful of the name "French Petroleum Company," a phenomenon further aggravated since 10 May. The creation of Raymond Poincare in 1924, CFP from the very beginning has been in the habit of retaining most of its real profits. Just in case.... This policy has enabled it to get through some serious turbulence undisturbed. But Harpagon is no adventurer and no explorer. Total initially limited its field of activity to the Middle East, then expanded to Algeria. But it has steered away from the African continent.

Up until recently, CFP drillers cracked jokes and pleasantries with their colleagues ("CFP - Cannot Find Petroleum"). Bad luck, lack of money, incompetence, poor organization? As soon as he arrived, Granier de Lilliac attacked this problem, which was posed with a new sharpness. The rules of the oil game were in fact changing, and it was already apparent that hydrocarbon resources were limited. Rather than resist the new policy of the oil producers, the new CFP president decided to go along with it.

Thus in 1972 CFP played a skillful game with its IPC [International Petroleum Company] partners (Mobil, Shell, BP, Exxon) and the Iraqi Government, which had just nationalized the Kirkuk fields. The 10-year contract signed by Paris and Baghdad left it virtually untouched by that nationalization, both in terms of quantities of crude delivered and in terms of price.

After the nationalization decreed by Algiers, and unlike Elf, CFP, once indemnified, decided to help SONATRACH [National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons] and established a new relationship with it. It even became its principal partner. And Total became Algeria's authorized agent in the Merekson field. Last year, CFP extracted around 10 million tons of Saharan crude, or almost the equivalent of its Iraqi yield (13 million tons). Thus, two countries ranked among the "socialist" group provided half the raw materials for the group in 1980.

Encouraged by these two experiments, Granier de Lilliac decided to revive the idea of industrial cooperation, which had been one of the important missions given to ERAP [Petroleum Prospecting and Activities Enterprises] when it was established. The president saw in it both a means of maintaining access to the oil in the

countries which revoked their concessions to the group, and a means of getting a number of crews working with others footing the bill. He confirmed this at the last general meeting: "The policy is thus a systematic purchasing policy. It requires a capacity for industrial cooperation..."

The most successful example of this new course is the contract providing for assistance to the state-owned company of Abu Dhabi to develop the upper Zakum field. Out of the 227 wells scheduled, 116 have already been drilled by 400 Total technicians. The field should produce 500,000 barrels per day (25 million tons per year). The group will get several million dollars for this assistance, but above all it will get rights to the production from the field. On that model, CFP has signed cooperation contracts with Sudan, Algeria, and Argentina, and hopes to sign one with Saudi Arabia.

But in oil there is never any 'insurance against "all risks." Algiers tied the CFP contract to the one with Gaz de France, which, with the support of the previous French government, refused to meet the natural gas price demanded by the Algerians. CFP takes its lumps in good spirit: the retail price of Algerian crude was almost equal to the official price, because of the heavy investments the group was obliged to make in Algeria. Every ton arriving in France in July amounted to a loss of about Fr 200 for the Total group. The sudden drop in consumption led the group in July to ask Algiers for a 40 percent reduction in extraction....

The future of the 10-year contract with Iraq is also open to question, despite the good relations both CFP and the French Government have with Baghdad. Mr Saddam Hussein, Iraq's number one, may, it is said, renew the contract expiring in June 1982 with France rather than with CFP. Then it would be SOFRACOP [expansion unknown], the subsidiary of the two groups responsible for executing government-to-government contracts, which would derive the benefits from the new Iraqi oil. The loss of that contract would not be tragic from the financial point of view. For if a part of the Kirkuk oil were invoiced at an attractive price, Baghdad was still virtually obliged to charge a supplementary tariff such that the average cost per barrel to Total was very close to the official levels.

While Mr de Lilliac was embarking on a new strategy, Total's prospectors remained quiet and unlucky. The Indonesian discovery has been their only "hit," small but profitable. Their disadvantage: lack of financial means. From 1970 to 1975, Total spent less than Fr 300 million per year, but from 1975 to 1980 it spent 700 million (see chart). The mediocre results and heavy outlays to develop Frigg (7.5 billion to build the natural gas pipeline network) caused the CFP leadership at first to allocate only the crumbs from the table to prospecting. In 1979, the number of meters drilled dropped again by 14.3 percent compared to the previous year. In this context, the efforts of the Labrador group appeared incongruous. There Total found natural gas which no one is presently able to exploit economically. It opted to disengage from that region in 1979.

This decision was an integral part of a redefinition of prospecting policy sought by the public authorities. CFP preferred to bet on the short and medium term and on on-shore rather than on off-shore. That year it surrendered half of its mineral domain in order to concentrate its efforts on promising zones. Then, last

year, it once again augmented its exploration licenses. Africa was the principal beneficiary of this tardy redeployment. Egypt, Sudan, Angola, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast are now the repositories of Total's hopes, even if its angle of vision is intercontinental, going from China to Boulogne-Maubeuge. The tardy acceleration of exploration efforts has yielded results: discoveries in Cameroon, Egypt, indications in China, in the North Sea, investments of more than 5 billion between now and 1982. Exploration and production personnel should increase by 50 percent before 1985. Total Exploration Production is the biggest employment center in Paris for itself and its partners: nearly 500 employees hired per year.

In order to carry out its complete mission, Total needs a great deal of money. It was only in 1979 that prospects really opened up. The results have "wiped out 10 lean years," according to one of the members of the executive board. MBA [cash flow] tripled in 1979, going to more than Fr 10 billion, due to the combined effects of inflation from the derrick to the pump. The group at last had means to match its ambitions. Especially since indebtedness which had gone dangerously high (0.46) to finance Frigg, had returned to a tolerable level (0.36). A plan to invest 25 billion by 1982 was immediately launched. To achieve this, the group would have to keep profits at their present level. This is not a given. In fact, the present condition of the French refinery is not encouraging.

CFR, the biggest French refiner and also the most capable, "was for 40 years the treasure-chest of the group," says a director in the Total group. But he immediately adds: "This is no longer true today." From 1973 to 1980, the MBA of CFR was Fr 9.5 billion, including 8.8 for stock assets. "The cash-flow is being used to finance stocks, that is ridiculous," retorts a CFR official, who notes bitterly: "The government no longer helps us by reflecting, however tardily and insufficiently, inflation in the dollar and by the producers." 1980 was a bad year. This time, the economic MBA is negative. The price levied on fuels does not explain everything. The cost of supplies for CFR--in other words the transfer price from CFP--is high. It does not have enough Saudi crude (150,000 barrels per day at present, or less than 15 percent of its liftings) and too much expensive petroleum. It is for this reason that Total recently broke loose from its Mexican, Nigerian, Kuwaiti, and especially Algerian contracts...The weakness of consumption moreover requires the refineries to operate at around 70 percent of their capacity. In July CFR lost Fr 500 million. It nevertheless pursues a program of modernization, because, "in time, the capacity to meet the competition will be decisive." To counterbalance the decline in consumption and structural changes, CFR has gone into research on new energies, particularly coal and carburol.

The resumption by ATO Chimie--a joint subsidiary of Elf-Aquitaine and Total--of some chemical activity at Rhone-Poulenc is another manifestation of the determination to attenuate the marketing losses from traditional refining. Petrochemicals, undergoing expansion, are a major marketing outlet for refining: nearly 8 percent of French petroleum product consumption.

Oil production was traditionally a major source of financing. The group, which has lost most of its Middle East concessions, is scarcely generating any profit now, for, with the notable exception of Frigg (Fr 1 billion per year), its

access to crude is in the OPEC countries. It is less fortunate than Elf-Aquitaine, which is largely living off two treasures: Lacq and Gabon. The small deposit at Abu al Bu Koosh (in Abu Dhabi) might nevertheless be considered decently profitable: \$3 per barrel in the first half of the year, or about \$200,000 per day (Fr 365 million per year). The oil extracted from the old Abu Dhabi concessions nets only around 75¢ per barrel. Dubai still brings in \$1.60 per barrel, Indonesia more than \$2. The distribution network, both in France and abroad, would need substantial new investments in order to be more efficient. Some foreign subsidiaries have been sacrificed. The changes are far from over. But the probable disappearance of its unique assets--the 10-year contract with Iraq, and that with Algeria--may once again raise the issue of combining the two French groups. Partners in the North Sea, in the Irish Sea, in Greece, in China...but also in technological development, and in the chemicals field, the two oilers nevertheless sometimes fight bitter battles. The justification for the Janus approach--Elf as an instrument of the state and Total in private hands--becomes more blurred with every passing day.

Monster

And the two groups increasingly depend for their supplies--nearly half of them--on government-to-government contracts aimed at the French market. The producers are less and less inclined to distinguish between the two French appendages. But their merger would create a monster still more difficult to tame than the two of them separately.


CFP's Record For 1980

La fiche CFP en 1980

Chiffre d'affaires (HT) ¹	101 044 MF
MBA ²	9 539 MF
Bénéfice ³	6 093 MF
Investissements ⁴	6 961 MF
Personnel du groupe ⁵	48 116
Brut commercialisé ⁶ (en millions de tonnes)	63,3

- KEY:
1. Turnover
 2. MBA [expansion unknown]
 3. Profit
 4. Investments
 5. Number of Persons Employed by the Group
 6. Gross Tonnage Marketed (in millions of tons)


Un approvisionnement vulnérable



- KEY:
1. Before Granier de Lilliac became president.
 2. In millions of tons.
 3. Resources
 4. Oil rights
 5. (Crude concessions and assimilated crude)
 6. Other purchases
 7. Outlets
 8. Within the group
 9. Overseas subsidiaries
 10. Foreign
 11. The main problem: finding outlets for the group's abundant crude concessions.
 12. Before the crisis.
 13. Resources
 14. Oil rights
 15. Other purchases
 16. Outlets
 17. Within the group
 18. Overseas subsidiaries
 19. Foreign
 20. Granier de Lilliac doubled the group's foreign markets. But as resources also increased, he still sold more than 20 million tons of crude to Total's overseas customers.
 21. Resources
 22. Oil rights
 23. Medium- and Long-Term Purchases
 24. Other purchases
 25. Outlets
 26. Within the group
 27. Overseas subsidiaries
 28. Foreign
 29. Oil rights diminished by more than half. But they were replaced by "firm" contracts with producing countries.
 30. Resources
 31. Oil rights
 32. Medium- and long-term purchases
 33. Other purchases
 34. Outlets
 35. Within the group
 36. Overseas subsidiaries
 37. Foreign
 38. A chaotic year: a euphoric first half, a very difficult second half. For the first time, the basic--in other words relatively reliable--resources, whether from concessions or long-term contracts, did not completely cover the needs of the group. Foreign sales of crude diminished by half in comparison with the early 1970's.
 39. Uncertainties
 40. Resources
 41. Oil rights
 42. Medium and long-term purchases
 43. Outlets

contract next year. Supplies are thus at the mercy of random factors. But this vulnerability is hidden by the overabundance of oil: it is presently more profitable to resort to short-term purchases.

The Slow Awakening of Total's Drillers



³ La faiblesse des résultats au début des années 70 n'explique pas complètement la torpeur de Total. Quand M. Granier de Lilliac prend la tête du groupe, le problème

- KEY:
1. Investments in oil exploration (in billions of francs).
 2. Gross percentage self-financed by CFP
 3. The poor results in the early 1970's cannot be attributed completely to Total's torpor. When Granier de Lilliac took over the leadership of the group, the number one problem was to find outlets for Middle East crude. The growth of reserves is no longer a problem. CFP only devotes 10 percent of its BMA [expansion unknown] to exploration, compared to Elf's 47 percent. Everything was turned upside down in 1973 with the oil crisis. From 1974 to 1978, Total increased its efforts (26.9 percent for CFP and 32.5 percent for Elf), but was held back by the financing of Frigg. The first big year, 1979, with more than 10 billion in MBA, brought with it a doubling of exploration in 1980. At last.

9516

CSO: 3100/910

MONETARY, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR FARMERS PLANNED

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 32, 6 Aug 81 p 36

[Exclusive Interview with Farm Insurance Organization President Vas. Tsiounis]

[Text] In an exclusive interview he granted to the O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS, Farm Insurance Organization [OGA] President Vas. Tsiounis revealed that as of this year the organization will protect with missiles, cannons and airplanes all agricultural production from natural disasters and especially from hail and frost.

"...Our objective," he said, "is to fulfill as best we can our obligations to the farmers. For this reason, we are not reluctant to use any innovation which will bring OGA nearer still to the Greek farmer."

"At the same time, along with the protection of the agro-production, the increase of pensions by 50 percent as already announced, the improvement of social insurance and medical-medicinal coverage, OGA aims also at protecting the farm population from all sorts of middlemen. In this way we insure the OGA income (editor's note: financially it functions as a distributive account) for the benefits of our insured members. Specifically, for some time now we have undertaken a crusade whereby the farmer is advised to always ask in his transactions with the merchants for a price list in order to assure the necessary contribution to the OGA fund."

With regard to the new technological systems OGA will start using this fall, it was made clear that 440 million drachmas will be invested for the project. It is estimated that this amount will be amortized within 1 year since it is hoped that the 2.5 billion drachma-indemnity OGA pays each year for losses from hail and frost only will be minimized if not eliminated completely.

In the context of this activity [protection of farm production] OGA will buy 120 special cannons which operate electronically, are noiseless and do not create pollution problems. They are installed permanently in one place and fire their "missiles" at the hail-bearing cloud as it approaches the area dissolving it. Each "missile" can cover an area of at least 700 stremmas around the cannon.

In the case of the hail-bearing and other clouds, the special missiles which hit their target at an altitude of 3,500 meters are more effective. But their use may interfere with air transportation and military planes. For this reason their firings will be made by joint agreement and advance warning with the appropriate authorities and when the meteorological services expect a wave of bad weather with

cloud accumulation. In certain particular cases, for the neutralization of hail clouds and other inclement weather threats, OGA will use special airplanes which will strike the cloud in flight. In this case, the simultaneous protection of many hundreds of streamas will be possible on a permanent basis.

It is noted that the insuring of the agro-production covers all farm businesses and all types of cultivations. Indicative is the fact that OGA makes an average of 1.2 million assessments annually, farm by farm (it made 1.7 million in 1979).

OGA's Dynamism

Characteristic of OGA's dynamism are the data Tsiounis gave showing that in the past 6 years the organization:

- a. Increased pensions four times (the percentage increases reached 500 percent) and is pensioning today 600,000 farmers.
- b. Increased the cost of insuring the agro-production from 410 million drachmas in 1974 to 3.5 billion drachmas for 1981 (a total increase of 600 percent).
- c. It increased the hospitalization costs from 1.2 billion in 1974 to 6.9 billion drachmas for 1981 (an increase of 600 percent). More specifically:

Pensions

In the sector of pensions, the related procedures were radically changed to make their distribution faster. The new pension checks are now issued by the Pensions Branch chief thus relieving the farmers of any hardship and other services. It especially relieves the justices of the peace from the burden of additional duties. Also a new procedure was initiated for distributing pensions to the widows of OGA pensioners. Such distribution is now almost automatic since basically only one justifying document is required.

The same spirit prevailed in eliminating many bureaucratic procedures in this sector so that the pension checks are today issued faster and more objectively than before.

Health

In this sector the following changes were made:

- a. The OGA pensioners can go abroad at no cost at all for medical treatment in all cases where such treatment is deemed necessary.
- b. For better medical care of the people in rural areas and in addition to the service offered by the state hospitals, OGA has signed agreements with more than 100 private clinics throughout Greece and with almost all artificial kidney units.
- c. A new, simpler set of medical relief regulations oriented to the life and needs of the farm population was adopted.
- d. Medicines which are particularly costly will be given free for certain chronic diseases.

e. Special care is provided for the blind, deaf and mute children as well as for the physically and mentally retarded.

In the agricultural sector in general the efforts followed two main directions and in such a way that each supplemented the other: the passive and the active directions. The first concerns mainly the expansion of the insurance system in force since 1960 to cover new losses such as from storms and floods. At the same time, the regulations concerning the insurance of agro-products were amended, thus establishing the time limits for such insurance and the procedures for assessing losses. The active or preventive direction concerns the protection of the agro-production through measures or, better, by the use of means for avoiding dangers and especially the dangers from frost and hail.

The preventive protection, an initiative of exceedingly great importance for both the farm income and the national economy, was first implemented in 1979 with the use of fans for protection from frost. The first groups consisting of 20 fans each were installed in Arta, Argolis and Nemea. Subsequently, 20 more fans were installed in Arta, 20 in Argolis and 13 in Lakonia. Already bids have been asked for installing 20 fans in Ileia and 20 in Akhaia.

7520

CSO: 4621/88

ALUMINUM PRODUCTION STATUS REPORTED

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek No 32, 6 Aug 81 p 36

[Text] With total business of 282 million dollars but with net profits reduced by 6 percent--total profits of 38.9 million dollars compared to 1979--the Aluminum of Greece Corporation [AGC], better known as PESINE, remains in 1980 still the largest enterprise in Greece. Having fixed assets of 13 billion drachmas in acquired prices and realizing in 1980 exports valued at 142 million dollars, AGC is at the same time covering 60 percent of the domestic aluminum market. On the other hand, in an effort to improve its productivity, the company--given that each aluminum plant consumes large amounts of electricity--strove to perfect its program which aims at:

- a. Limiting energy losses.
- b. More efficiently utilizing every calorie and kilowatt hour.

Thus, the energy consumption in the AGC plant is smaller by 14 and 12 percent than the average consumption by American and European plants, respectively, with the result that this plant is among those throughout the world which show the best record as concerns energy saving.

Last year also, an effort was made to contribute to the better protection of the environment which, however, necessitated a somewhat greater consumption of energy.

Within this framework the company achieved important projects in this sector. Some of them are:

- a. Recycling the heat from fumes and boilers.
- b. Installation of a turbine-generator complex which allows the use of all intensified steam leaving the boilers.

These investments are in accordance with the government directives for reducing energy consumption.

Relations With the Personnel

According to the company's annual report, the relations with its personnel were good. The company exerted great efforts to reduce accidents--they decreased by about 50 percent--and there was a mutual company-personnel interest to improve the

social as well as financial condition of the working people. Finally, a Work-Health Service was established.

Investments

On the basis of the 28 March 1980 agreement and presidential decree, the state allowed the company to assume a significant investment program which involves an increase in the capacity to produce alumina by 100,000 tons annually, various costs for renewals and new projects which concern mainly the modernization of departments and installations (assembly lines, alumina loading) and the construction of new houses for the AGC personnel at Aspra Spitia. -

Following readjustment of the new budget, the company's total outlays are estimated at 170 million dollars over a period of about 4 years.

Finally, it should be noted that the French parent company, PESINE, in its catalogue makes reference to the nationalization of enterprises by the French Socialist Party. This will have at least a legal impact on the agreement between the French company and the Greek government.

7520

CSO: 4621/88

HERMIER ON PCF, PS RELATIONS; EUROCOMMUNISM, WORKING CLASS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 24 Jul 81 pp 20-21

[Interview with Guy Hermier, member of the PCF Politburo and director of REVOLUTION, by Fabrizio D'Agostini and Augusto Pancaldi, date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Question] Of recent years the response to the crisis in the West has followed neoliberalist lines (Giscard, Thatcher, Reagan). Now the French left, with a government of socialists and communists, is in a position to provide some new answers, In your view, what is new and different in this government's action and program, and what is ahead?

[Answer] To tell the truth, Giscard's policies not only failed to respond to the crisis in French society: they aggravated it. Speaking for the interests of the French-based multinationals, the Giscard government did its level best to funnel as much as possible of the nation's resources and talents their way. We all know where that has led: still harsher austerity, soaring inflation, steady erosion of the workers' hard-won rights, massive unemployment and tenuous job security, demolition of whole sectors of our economy, and a nation increasingly dependent on foreign countries.

A healthy majority of our people recently rejected this policy. The nation now expects its victory over the right to lead to adoption of a new policy. The policy agreement between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party affords a glimpse of some of the elements in our response. It calls first of all for finding new paths to growth, with due respect for economic balance, so as to create the conditions for an effective fight against joblessness and inflation. A whole body of measures have been taken, and more will come, to get our people eating and buying again and to narrow our social disparities. Major reforms will be launched dealing with such matters as reducing the work week to a targeted 35 hours, lowering the retirement eligibility age, decentralization, expanding workers' rights, and so on. Economic and social action will reflect the thrust of nationalization of our banking and credit systems, as well as that of eleven industrial conglomerates, as

a guarantee of the efficaciousness and democratization of the planning process. Finally, while honoring its alliances, France will begin a drive for peace and gradual disarmament through simultaneous dissolution of both military blocs, thus assuring the balance of forces in Europe and throughout the world and the security of each individual country.

The major thrusts of the legislative programs the prime minister has just presented to the National Assembly run along these same lines.

Naturally this policy does not embrace all our proposals. We continue to believe that they are correct and necessary if we are truly to get our country out of this crisis. But we also bear in mind the options selected by our people as to the rate at which we advance toward those changes the country needs. We stand ready to act, within the new majority and in a constructive manner, to get results, and to do our part to solve the problems that will inevitably arise, so as to encourage every step forward. And we are ready to do this as what we are, in our own particular way. Solidarity and differences: that is our attitude.

[Question] The PCF attitude toward the PS has been marked, of recent years, by lusty polemics. Starting with the second round of the presidential elections, and hence with participation in the Mauroy government, there has been a change in this attitude. Why was that? You have been accused, here and elsewhere, of making a mere tactical shift in exchange for the chance to be in the government. What actually did go on? On what issues did the PCF and PS accommodate one another in the areas of economics and international policy, to cite only the most complex and delicate of them?

[Answer] Neither before nor after the elections was our behavior dictated by mere tactical concerns. In the campaign for the presidency we openly stated our twofold objective of beating Giscard d'Estaing and creating the best possible conditions for the changeover. Our candidate, Georges Marchais, explained over and over again that a change of this magnitude required adoption of a new policy, a united left government including communists and socialists, and broad popular support. We did our very best to see that a truly nationwide debate on the substance of these issues took place, so that our people might base their decisions on full cognizance of the issues. It was in this context and with a determination to move forward that we criticized some of the Socialist Party positions. And we believe that this frank debate was helpful.

As it turned out, the French decided with their votes first in the presidential elections and, immediately afterwards, in the legislative balloting. No question about it: the vote we got in the elections were not exactly gratifying to us. We shall be talking about that as we prepare for our 24th Congress, resolutely directing our efforts toward regaining our influence.

Having said that, we are keenly aware of universal suffrage, and we abide by its verdict. This attitude is in no way a policy pro-tem,

nor does it signify any draconian revision. On the contrary: it is right on the line of our 22d and 23rd Congresses, at which we stressed the point that the necessary social transformations depended at once upon the capacity of the people's movement to move forward along this road and upon the capacity of the communists to contribute to this advance at the pace set by our people. In a word, we stand available for every bit of progress.

It is in this spirit, with a determination to create the best possible conditions for the change to succeed, that we sought out the bases for a political agreement with the Socialist Party, which would allow the formation of a government of union embracing all the left and would include some communist cabinet ministers. On this basis, the agreements reached on 4 June and on 23 June mapped out the guidelines for a new policy, directed toward greater social justice, the fight against unemployment, sweeping democratic reforms, and a new role for France. And we did all this without violence to any of the fundamental positions to which the PCF remains committed. In this way it was possible, for the first time in 34 years, for communist ministers to join the government of France. It is an event whose scope and impact we have only begun to measure, in France and in the world -- especially in Europe.

[Question] Your Central Committee has made an initial analysis of the reasons for the weak showing of the PCF. I should like to ask you this: to what extent today, in societies as complex as our Western ones, can communist parties use the working class as the societal reference point that sets them apart from all the rest? Above and beyond the matter of alliances, are there not perhaps social and non-social sectors which, in capitalist societies, live under conditions that deprive them of prosperity and even of democracy, conditions as grave and even a great deal worse than those typical of the working class? And hasn't the PCF perhaps underestimated the magnitude of this order of problems?

[Answer] In our analyses of our defeat in the elections we try to get to the bottom of things. To tell the truth, the PCF has, for the past 20 years, been piling up a massive historical lag in the formulation of its strategy for the advance toward socialism that would be attuned to the conditions of our times and to the real state of affairs in France. With the guidelines laid down at its 22d and 23rd Congresses, the Party today has such a strategy. But it only began implementing it a short time ago, and in a unique political situation, in which all the consequences of the crisis in our society came together with the pressures of institutional machinery and the negative effects of dusty answers, inadequate to the needs of today's fight for ever more advanced democratic victories culminating in socialism. Our critical examination of what we did during that period is based on those very same fundamental issues.

At our last Central Committee meeting, for example, we underscored the need to deepen our understanding of the reality that is French society, of the profound changes that have come about within it, so as to make a better evaluation of the diversity of categories among workers and of their disparate situations. This of course raises the problem of the alliance between the working class and the other reaches of society.

In this connection, I don't believe there is such a thing, when you talk about our party's policy, as appealing solely to the working class. On the contrary: for years, now, we have been developing a broad policy of unity and alliances, without which no democratic progress is possible. What we have to do instead is to take care lest, in the implementation of that policy, the top priority we will always assign to the working class be interpreted as reflecting a policy confined to that class.

Aside from this, though, we are also encountering new problems in relation to certain processes of social decay involved in the crisis. And this is what we are finding, for example, among young people, among immigrant workers, and in some of our urban areas where the poorest of the poor tend to live. We have, lately, been giving these problems our closest and most intensive attention. It is an effort we must continue and expand still further.

[Question] Let's talk a bit about the structure, the features of the PCF, and about communist parties in general, too. To what extent do you think that the Western democratic societies we live in nowadays tend to make this structure seem inadequate -- challenge its validity? For example: in a Western democratic society the mass media perform a function essential to democracy through their orientation of public opinion. And -- here is my point -- aren't there certain structural features in the PCF -- or in communist parties in general -- that are inimical to these requirements?

[Answer] The life of a revolutionary party cannot be static. Let's take just one example. We argue that the issue of democracy lies at the heart of economic, political, and social life. We make it the end and the means of our strategy. But the same issue arises in relation to the Communist Party itself. This is why, at our last Congress, we amended our constitution and bylaws, specifically in the direction of enrichment of our democratic practices.

All the same, we do not think it right to pattern the life of our party after that of society, or to identify it as a preview or foretaste of the kind of democratic, people-run socialism we want for France. For us, this is a matter of principle. We accept all the implications of pluralism. Now pluralism presupposes a distinction in principle between the parties and the State, and between the parties and society. What point would there be to pluralism if the Communist Party were to mirror within itself all the myriad quirks and factions we see in our society? Recognition of pluralism in social life requires, on the contrary, an affirmation of the revolutionary party and of its primordial principles of organization.

Your example of the mass media is significant in this connection. No question but that they play a very important role today in the molding of public opinion. But under the Giscard government, which had infiltrated every cog in the media machine, the media were constantly used by the bourgeoisie to fight our party, to distort its policies, and even to attempt to influence its internal affairs and its decisions.

This experience, which may be peculiar to France, serves to underscore the way in which the party's organizational principles are a guarantee of its democratic vitality and of its effectiveness.

[Question] Something generally referred to as Eurocommunism has been a major factor in the role of Western communist parties. Does the PCF feel that conditions are ripe today for a revival of Eurocommunism, and if so, on what bases, in view of the major issues now before us, such as expansion of the European Community, negotiations on missiles in Europe, the situation in Afghanistan, and the future of Poland?

[Answer] We do not see the question in terms of a revival, because we have always argued against the idea advanced by many observers -- the notion that Eurocommunism had ground to a halt, or was actually dead. Eurocommunism was born of the converging lines of several communist parties in capitalist countries -- including our own -- which place the growth of democracy at the very center of the road to socialism they are traveling in their own countries. And this is no ephemeral phenomenon.

A large portion of the press makes a great deal of noise about the differences between this and that party. Some discovery! None of us would dream of ignoring those differences. We just happen to believe that it is better to recognize them openly and calmly, thereby making it easier to find more flexible and effective ways of stating positions and undertaking concerted action on the basis of jointly defined goals. More generally, I can state that it is awareness of this universal need for expanding democracy in socialism that inspires the lines of a growing number of communist parties -- even in the socialist countries. Therefore I share the views of Georges Marchais, who said: "It does not seem to me that Eurocommunism is dead: it has merely been cramped in too tight a suit, and needs a new tailor. We need to promote a new internationalism, roomy enough to accommodate everything that is moving ahead in the world."

[Question] It has always been accepted wisdom that the institutions of the Fifth Republic had been tailored to the measure of Gaullism, and designed to obviate alternatives. But, as it turns out, it didn't work that way. Its institutions did not prevent the left from getting into power in France. Has this new finding changed the communists' perception of French institutions? If not, what changes are you asking for, and what are your target dates for them?

[Answer] Actually, the institutions of the Fifth Republic were designed to buttress the power of big capital and to limit the expression of democracy. The extreme personalization of politics, the concentration of power, and the electoral system combined made it possible to snuff out some local vitality, to distance the decision-making centers from the citizens, and to encourage delegation of powers. Of course all this did not keep the left out of power. But the institutional machinery, and the polarization of politics that resulted from it, clearly worked against us, and were one of the major reasons for our defeat in the elections. We ourselves underestimated their effects to a degree, and now

we intend to get down to some much deeper and more serious thinking about the whole subject.

In any case, we have not changed our opinion of these institutions, and we have openly urged that they be made more democratic. One first giant step in that direction might be taken by adopting the proportional system.

6182

CSO: 3104/360

PS EDITOR ON POLICY, FACTIONS; PCI, EC, PCF RELATIONS

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 24 Jul 81 pp 21-23

[Interview with Claude Estier, spokesman for the Socialist Party and director of L'UNITE, by Fabrizio D'Agostini and Augusto Pancaldi, date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Claude Estier is one of the political point-men in the force that swept Mitterrand into the Elysée and his Socialist Party to an absolute majority in Parliament and to the head of the leftist government. A delegate to the European Parliament since last year, Estier now also sits as a deputy in the National Assembly.

[Question] Of recent years the "new" responses to the crisis in the West have been those proffered by the neoliberals: France may now be giving us a different kind of response altogether, with its government of socialists and communists. What, in your view, are the particular features of this response, which to our eyes looks different not only from the liberalist answer, but especially from anything the social democrats have yet tried?

[Answer] Fact one: the solutions offered for the crisis in Western Europe by the systems known as neoliberalist, or rather by the systems operating under economic liberalism, have led thus far in practically every country where they have been tried to dismal failure. The bankruptcy of these policies in France was obvious, and it was perceived as such by a large majority of French voters, who rejected Giscard and Barre because the policies they had pursued for the last 7 years (but which others before them had long clung to) were seen by the voters as unable to cope with the problems that arise in a society like ours: the problems of the crisis, of course, but also those of our social inequities, which have grown steadily more acute of recent years. I believe this is one of the earmarks of what is called liberalism these days: taking the crisis as a given, it sought above all else to turn it to some advantage. And that explains why, over all these years in France -- but the same holds true for other countries as well -- we have seen remarkable growth in the profits of a good number of big corporations, of the banks, and of a whole string of companies that were taking advantage of the crisis even as that crisis, which was and is the crisis

of capitalism, was crushing more and more of those who did not belong to what is called the money power. And thus we have witnessed the aggravation of social inequalities in a nation like France, which has now become one of the least egalitarian countries around, and the simultaneous uninterrupted growth of the profits of big business. This is the prime cause of the stunning rejection we saw during the presidential and legislative elections against that money power, embodied by Giscard and Barre. Of course there are other motivations, too, particularly Giscard's personal behavior in office. I believe, though, that the fundamental explanation is the fact that the French increasingly sensed that profits were reserved for a tiny privileged minority and that the great generality of citizens were effectively barred from any share in the benefits of their country's economic growth.

It is on the basis of this finding that the socialists, who are now in power, must come up with a different kind of answer from the one that has failed thus far. And we are not talking about a merely theoretical answer: we do not live in an abstract society, but rather in a society deeply scarred by this government of the right, and by the inequities and the injustices it will be our task to set right. We are, however, also living in an international economic context which we most assuredly cannot overlook. France is intimately tied into a whole international economic system, both within the EEC and through every area of its trade, and clearly you cannot simply define a new economic policy that does not take that fact into account. To cite only the most flagrant example these days, it is obvious that we are paying a very high price for the rise in interest rates which is the direct consequence of American policy on the dollar. It is not enough to say that we ought to create new conditions which would encourage corporate investments in France. That is a political objective, but we are well aware that to achieve it we shall first have to get around a number of obstacles, which not only color such decisions as we might make in France's government, but must also be fitted into an international context.

The big difference is that we are determined first to introduce a new political will. The obstacles we shall encounter -- I think of interest rates -- are not new of themselves, nor were they born of the advent of a socialist government, as the right seeks to make us believe. There is no economic decision which is not rooted first and foremost in political will. What we have blamed the former regime for -- and the French at last have understood us -- is substantially its *laissez-aller*, its *laissez-faire*. We propose to bring to bear a political will based on the idea that the first thing to be done is to redress the inequities that have profoundly undermined French society. We must, to put it in a formula, make the rich pay so that the poor will be less poor: that is the meaning of what has been done thus far since the socialist government took office. To start with, they are only first-aid measures: raising the minimum wage, increasing family and household subsidies, etc., or, in a word, anything that can help the most disadvantaged of

us to be a little less so. Now, as Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy told the National Assembly, we must get to work on reforming the structures. First-aid measures are simply not enough to turn around the momentum of the no-holds-barred liberalism of Giscard and Barre, which has worn such deep and painful grooves in the fiber of our society.

Structural reform, then, and meanwhile the nationalization program Mauroy has presented to Parliament is in total consonance with Mitterrand's commitments during the presidential campaign. I shall sum it up for you in two sentences. On the one hand, total control of the banking and credit system as the basic requisite for directing the French economy; and on the other hand, restoring our vanguard industry, which is now in the hands of private monopolies, to the national collectivity. Just the most flagrant example: it is not proper that arms manufacturers -- Dassault, Matra -- which survive solely on government contracts, should be run today by private capitalists who derive profits from them for purposes other than those of the State. We must restore conditions that will enable the public collectivity (and by that I do not mean the State: we are not talking about State takeovers) to recover control over these great enterprises that will set the course for reorganization of the French economy.

This is the new answer the French socialists will give the nation. It is utterly different, I should say opposite from that of the previous regime; but it is also a very different answer from the social democratic experiments that have been made in Europe, since, while it is true that they -- I am thinking here of the Scandinavian social democracies -- have succeeded in a thoroughly sound and realistic effort to reduce social inequities, they have never really considered taking control of the essential machinery of the economy. What sets French socialism apart is that it seeks at once to rectify social inequities and to take over the major controls of the economy.

[Question] French socialism spent many a year wandering in the desert before it rose to command an absolute majority and form a government. Will this socialism, this Mitterrand-style socialist party, succeed in keeping the many unruly spirits in its ranks -- from Defferre to Rocard and Ceres and the rest -- united?

[Answer] The French Socialist Party did indeed wander in a desert before it achieved this extraordinary victory. That is what it looks like at first glance. Yet if you look a little further, you find that French socialism managed to come back from practically nowhere, exactly 10 years ago in June 1971, at the Epinay Congress where Mitterrand pulled the weak and scattered remnants of the disparate groups and organizations that believed in French socialism back together and welded them into a new French Socialist Party. Ten years later, the PS commands an absolute majority and has one of its own as president of France, at the head of the government, and presiding over the National Assembly. Ten years may seem and indeed is a long time for the members who kept

on working through victory and defeat, always striking out on the march again; yet in terms of history, 10 years are but a watch in the night. To have started from practically zero in 1971 and reach today's victory is probably a political exploit unequalled, unprecedented in our nation's history, at least.

I believe that credit for this unparalleled exploit ought to go first of all to the man who has led it from the start: Francois Mitterrand, the man who, before anybody else, grasped the fact that there was no chance whatsoever to beat the right in this country without first putting together a socialist party that could achieve primacy on the left. For one thing, French society is such that, so long as there was a communist party on the left which commanded a wide majority by comparison with the socialist forces, there was no hope of overthrowing the majority. You will also remember that in those days the Gaullists, then at the peak of their power, were altogether comfortable with this situation, to the point where Malraux could say: "There is nothing between us and the Communists in France." The right had grasped the fact that so long as there was no socialist party worthy of the name, the dialectic that was taking shape between the right as a whole and the communist party would boil down to the perpetuation of the rightists in power. Mitterrand was the first to understand the nature of this dialectic: this apparently unbreakable chain could be sundered only when the day dawned on which a socialist party would emerge that was capable of gaining primacy on the left -- provided it did so within the context of unity on the left, by taking its stand on the ground held by the workers, by the working class, by the reunited forces of the people. This has been Mitterrand's idea ever since 1971; it was his idea even before that, but ever since he put the Socialist Party back together it has been his goal. Then came the alliance with the PCF, which has had its ups and downs: at first, it paved the way to tremendous gains for the left as a whole, and for the PS first of all; then came the split in 1977; but we kept the wheel steady on our course, even though there were those in the party who argued that we should change that course, reach out for dialogue with other political parties in the center, on the center-left and on the center-right. Mitterrand, and those who stood by him, were determined never to change course away from the line of left union, to hold fast to it through the violent storm of polemics that raged for years between us and the PCF, and to rekindle hope among the people on the left that some day they would see the united forces of the left in power.

And so our wanderings in the desert seemed long, yes; but after all, in terms of history, the time was not so long as all that. And I think that the millions of French people who helped form this grand coalition of popular forces were aware of and touched by the determination and the perseverance Mitterrand and his PS displayed. So quite naturally, when they were given a choice between the Giscard government with its record of failure and the hope for genuine change based on a clearly affirmed political, economic, and social will, well, the majority of the French knew how to vote because they had confidence in the Socialist Party and in its ability to bring all the forces of the people together.

There you have it: that's what happened. And it also explains how an electoral system designed specifically by the right to crush the left -- by an ironic twist of fate abetted and increased the victory of the PS, which with only a relative majority of the votes captured a broad absolute majority of seats in Parliament. In short, the PS's great leap was the fruit of 10 years of patient, unremitting work toward the same unchanging goal.

Will the PS be able to hold onto its unity? That question has been in the air ever since the party was put back together. What sets it apart from the other French parties is its willingness to recognize the existence of factions, of divergent ideological and social attitudes. These factions and attitudes have clashed on many occasions, sometimes violently, giving rise to internecine struggles that occasionally affected events outside the party. Our opponents were forever saying: just look at this socialist party, unable to achieve the slightest trace of homogeneity or consistency, with leaders who never leave off quarreling with one another. Well, I believe that what looked like weakness in the PS was actually its strength. The French recognized themselves in a party in which debate was always out in the open, never hidden away; in a party that was not monolithic, a party whose decisions were never made on high and handed down without argument to the lower levels of responsibility. That institutionalized tradition of continual debate within the PS has its drawbacks, of course, because it is sometimes difficult to control. Yet, at the same time, I believe that this is what enabled the PS to make an overall impression on French society as a whole. The PS today is a popular party or, if we want to say it in jargon, an inter-class party, in the sense that it speaks for the whole of French society precisely because of the way the party is organized into disparate factions, more or less radical, more or less moderate, some Marxist and some not; because it accepts argument as such, and because its free debate is guaranteed (or supervised) by a man whose authority was recognized by all, even when there were those who questioned the wisdom of his candidacy for the presidency (although now everybody agrees that it was indeed wise, and there is no more argument on that score); and because the party manages to embrace both open internal debate and unity. The Socialist Party's unity today is greater than ever: everybody knows that once you have won and are running the government it is always easier to maintain unity than it is after you have lost. Of course, had we lost the elections, it might well have been possible to question the likelihood of survival of its unity. I think that question does not arise today, and I hope that, in an atmosphere as democratic and upright as ever, debate within the party will continue. The gravest danger threatening the Socialist Party today is that of turning into what we call a "cotillion" party, meaning a party that is merely an obedient dancing partner to the State, to the president, to the government; I trust -- and we shall do everything in our power to make sure -- that it will manage to keep debate, and criticism, and questioning over what the government does and announces its intention of doing alive.

[Question] The institutions of the Fifth Republic, contrary to their design and contrary to most predictions, did leave room for the defeat of the political alignments in power. Has your attitude toward those institutions changed, or do you still believe they must be changed? And if so, how ought they to be changed, and at what rate? How are you planning to restore Parliament to its function as a legislature?

[Answer] I was just now talking about ironic twists of history. One could scarcely find a more poignant example than the way the institutions of the Fifth Republic, designed by General de Gaulle for his own intents and purposes, and partly with an eye to keeping the left permanently out of office, were turned against the right, which had profited by them for a quarter of a century, and now stand as bulwarks for a stable and lasting leftist government. It should also be noted that the French have totally assimilated these institutions. They have no doubt at all about the fact that their power base is the election of the president by universal suffrage; they know that once they have done that, all the rest follows automatically. Equally noteworthy is the remarkable good sense and logic with which the majority of Frenchmen have behaved over the past several weeks. They wanted a change; they understood that change would come about primarily through the election of a new president; the institutions are there to say that it must be done that way, and so those who tried to talk to the voters about a change, but were clearly linked to the incumbent government -- I'm thinking of Jacques Chirac -- simply were not believed. They wanted a different president, and they chose Mitterrand. And then, despite everything the rightists could say between the presidential election and the legislative balloting, the French gave an even greater majority to the left -- socialist and communist alike -- understanding that the institutions of the Fifth Republic are rooted in harmony among the president, the government, and Parliament. In four successive rounds of balloting the people answered in the same way, and all the hopes of the rightists, who had been betting on a possible turnabout, were dashed.

And so it came to pass that for the first time in France it was the institutions themselves that guaranteed the left a lasting term in office (the 7-year presidential mandate) and a stable one (the PS's absolute majority is even broader on the left in Parliament, a body which is elected for a 5-year term). Hitherto, whenever the left did make it into power, it invariably got there under extremely precarious conditions. The Popular Front in 1936 was almost immediately plunged into crisis by political events abroad (let's not forget that it was the same government that in 1940 handed the presidency to Petain); after the liberation, but in a totally different situation, the government of national unity was able to function for only a couple of years; in 1956 the Republican Front, which might be counted as a sort of victory for the left, soon came to grief over the Algerian war and had to forswear the policy upon which it had been elected.

But now for the first time the left is in power to stay, and can implement the program upon which it was elected knowing that it has both the strength and the time to do it: and for this certainty, too, we can thank the institutions of the Fifth Republic. No, no: we shall not be challenging the Constitution. There are other things to be done in this country than plunging into a great constitutional debate. The only thing we want to reaffirm has to do with the way the institutions actually work, rather than any reforms in them: first of all, we shall put a stop to presidential abuse of the Constitution in usurping to the Elysée the constitutional powers of the government; and secondly we shall restore its rightful powers to Parliament, which for 20 years has been reduced to the status of a mere echo chamber, where not only the opposition, but even the majority were unable to play any meaningful role whatever. This we must change right now, and I think that the first statements by Mitterrand and Mauroy run in that direction.

[Question] You are a member of the European Parliament, too. What is the Socialist Party's vision of Europe? What is the thrust of the proposal Mitterrand made in Luxembourg about a "social space"?

[Answer] That is a very important issue. The French socialists have always been in favor of building a real European Community. Unfortunately, they have had to face the fact -- and I say this as a member of the European Parliament -- that there is no Community. There are some policies, or rather there is a policy, the farm policy, that more or less works, and it is under fire from several EEC members: aside from that, there is practically nothing. Every now and then there is talk in Parliament about the need for a social policy, or a regional policy; but in the end each member of the EEC goes off on its own and tries to find a way out of the crisis that involves all of us, each with its own means and its own initiative. Well, I think that now that France has a socialist-run government and a broad leftist coalition, Europe is a vital dimension to the solution of some of our really big economic and social problems (and we might add cultural problems, as well). I see here an opportunity for Europe to get its second wind. France under Giscard had resigned, to all intents and purposes, from European concerns of late years. Before his election, Giscard passed himself off as an active and committed Europeanist. But the record of his 7 years in power has shown that in this (and for that matter in many other areas of French foreign policy) his attitude was primarily one of slackness, of letting things ride, unguided by consistency or will. For instance, he had one idea that was interesting in that it might have sparked some real response: it was to call regular meetings of Community heads of state or government which, at the summit level, could issue sets of guidelines to solve problems that the ministers found beyond them. But once he had floated the suggestion, Giscard failed to follow through, with the result that the summit meetings ran into the same deadlocks the ministers of the various sectors had encountered, because no truly big ideas were offered, and the meetings wound up where they had left off, tangled in the very same polemics and quarrels: just think back

to the issue of the English contribution. In short, a new institution was created, but, like all the others, it was doomed to wither and vanish in the quagmire of the arguments and selfishness of each of the member nations in the Community.

The new idea the French socialists would like to suggest today is that we must get back to the European dimension in seeking to resolve the problems raised by the economic and social crisis. Mitterrand talks of "social space"; that looks like tremendous progress over the "judicial space" Giscard proposed for repressive purposes. In other words: if we want to create new working conditions, shorten the work week, and organize our timing, we can do it far more effectively if we all move in the same direction in our several countries, rather than each of us making decisions on our own which would instantly expose us to the pitiless competition of the others.

[Question] In this particular area, how do you view your relations with the Italian Communist Party?

[Answer] I believe that the Italian Communists totally share this concern of ours: I have had occasion to observe this in the European Parliament every time the subject was broached.

The PCI -- and this really struck me, the more so in that it amounted to a clear-cut difference from the PCF -- seemed to me on a number of occasions quite favorable to the European Community, precisely on this concept of a European dimension to our economic and social problems. More than once in Strasbourg I have seen the French socialists, pulling with them the other European socialists, taking the same positions as the Italian communists, and joining in concerted initiatives. That was, I think, the beginning of what can be done, and of something that in any case will carry greater weight in the time to come -- at any rate on France's side, to the extent that there will be a socialist government at home to back these initiatives and to pave the way for their passage. There is considerable meaning in the fact that we have appointed a minister for European Affairs, who is not a foreign minister, but a man appointed specifically to keep an eye on European issues. And it would be very helpful if, on the basis of this open readiness on the part of the French socialists to get Europe off to a new start, we were to open a dialogue at all levels between ourselves and the Italian communists as to ways of concerting our efforts behind a push to get things moving again.

[Question] Here, as in Italy, there has always been discrimination against the communists at the behest of the United States. It would seem that this discrimination really has no decisive effect. Be that as it may, however, what are the most delicate and most complicated issues -- at home and on the international plane -- that gave you the idea -- in the past and again now -- of a governing alliance between socialists and communists?

[Answer] I should say right offhand, and categorically, that we will not tolerate United States meddling in the formation of a French government. President Mitterrand stated that quite forcefully, when, with no wish to damage the necessary good relations between France and the United States, he let it be known very clearly to Vice President Bush, when he visited Paris, and to the American authorities in general that France, France's present government, and France's socialists would not allow interference by any foreign power, even the United States of America, in France's domestic politics and hence in the composition of France's government. We can bear that in mind, because in fact there are several precedents for American intervention, in relation to Italy, among other matters; once there was the slightest indication of such meddling viz-à-vis the new French government, they were intolerable, and in fact they were not tolerated. Maybe the Americans discovered that they had made a mistake. Whether they like it or not, though, that is the way things are, and they will simply have to swallow the fact that the new French government, with which they are going to have to deal in view of normal relations between France and the United States, includes socialists and communists. Some other countries have indicated their reservations as to the makeup of the new French government, but none has tried to meddle so openly as the U.S. I am thinking here of Federal Germany. Chancellor Schmidt was probably not overjoyed at seeing communists seated in the French cabinet; but on the one hand he was very careful not to let his chagrin surface in public, and on the other hand -- here I refer to his recent meeting with Mitterrand -- nobody has seen any indication that relations between the French and German governments have suffered as a result. So be it.

So much for the international aspect of the presence of communist ministers. Let's talk now about the issue of the alliance between the socialists and the communists. The unswerving line the PS has followed under Mitterrand's leadership -- I have already said this -- has been to seek unity among the forces of the people: to put that in political terms, alliance between the socialists and communists.

We have indeed sought it, and we achieved it through the joint 1972 platform, and we went on seeking it even after the break, which we still believe the communists wanted in 1977. The PCF has its reasons, and I have no intention of discussing them here today because the whole matter has now become an issue for the PCF itself to deal with and one which, no matter how it intends to face it, is one it cannot dodge.

Beginning after 1977, the PCF decided to strike out in a different direction, whose clear objective was to narrow the gap between itself and the PS, or, in other words, to cut the PS itself down to size and seek thereby to win back primacy on the left. This is the origin of the charges of betrayal, the attempt to discredit the PS at all costs. Well, that policy has led to a very serious defeat, a historic defeat for the PCF, which in the presidential elections garnered the lowest percentage of votes it had drawn since the Twenties. So there is food for thought

for the PCF. This, however, is their business. As for us, we have always said that we would never stop seeking union, but that this requires two things: first, that the attacks cease -- there can be no alliance, especially one for governing together, if one party to the alliance spends all its time attacking the other --; second, that some minimal agreement be reached on a number of the major issues that predominate today in the action and approaches of the French government. This does not mean -- no matter what people keep writing -- that we are asking the PCF to line up to a man on socialist positions: we are not asking the communists to join the PS. It is altogether fitting and proper for the two parties to maintain their individuality, their own orientation, and I should even say their own programs. But it was indispensable to put together an agreement for governing that covered the great current issues over the short, medium, and long term, so as not to find ourselves faced all of a sudden with a divided government riven by factional disputes, like those of these last few years.

Just such a governing agreement was reached, and made public. Did the PCF sign it for purely tactical reasons, or for more basic ones? Time will tell. I shall confine myself to believing, and saying so, that the PCF has indeed grasped the fact that the French people, in the presidential and legislative elections, decided that the PS was right and the PCF was wrong, and that therefore it was a demonstration of realism on the part of the communists to face up to that essential fact, which was that the majority of French voters had said "yes" to the Mitterrand-PS program and "no" to that of the PCF. This was the basis on which the governing agreement was reached. This, however, does not mean that the problem does not exist, or that there will not be problems. But in any case, once the sniping stopped and the governing agreement was signed, it followed logically from everything Mitterrand and the PS had done to bring the communists into the government. That is a logic which the French have thoroughly understood, witness the fact that, in spite of every trick the right tried to frighten them with the bogeyman of communism, they voted for socialist candidates and they voted for communist candidates. I very much want to call attention to one thing that may perhaps have gone unnoticed in the great socialist victory on 21 June: every single communist candidate still on the ballot for the second round, without exception, won election. In other words, they got the votes of the entire socialist electorate in the first round, when at least a third of those voters were casting their ballots for the PS for the first time in their lives. This should suffice to prove that the communist bogeyman no longer scares anybody, especially now that the balance of power on the left has become what it is today.

Be that as it may, Mitterrand's logic and his party's logic demanded formation of a government reflecting the presidential majority. The PCF, most likely after conducting an exquisitely painful revision, has taken its place in that majority. It is obvious that Mitterrand would not have been elected on 10 May without the 4.5 million communist votes,

and that therefore it would have been a near-fatal blow to the unity of the people's parties had a portion of that majority stayed out of the government. On the basis of that rationale, Mitterrand and Mauroy insisted on having communist ministers with important responsibilities, which -- we are confident -- they will live up to with every intention of taking part in a new experiment, one that is designed to effect a profound transformation in French society.

6182

CS0: 3104/360

PRESUMED DATES FOR GENERAL ELECTIONS

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 16-22 Jul 81 pp 16-17

[Text] The date for the elections is being assessed from one day to the next, but in the meantime the government is trying hard to choose the most suitable date to hold them. It is taking into account in its evaluation at least some factors which are unrelated to its party interests. While awaiting the official announcement, the press and political figures are trying to predict the date of the elections, which perforce--according to the Constitution--cannot be later than 19 December. That is to say, one month after the term of office of the Chamber of Deputies expires. And if it is earlier, any premature dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies--before 19 November--must be "justified." They are talking about 18 October, about 20 September, about the "beginning of October," and so forth. But even with the date of the elections uncertain, the election-campaign contest has caught fire now, and disputes are occurring at all levels of the party hierarchies, from the leaders down to the most humble propagandists of the coffee-houses.

As the EPIKAIRA has written already, the focal point of these squabbles is the national issues. And this focusing is regarded as a victory for the New Democracy Party [ND], which prefers this broad terrain over the swamps of economic and social affairs. It is a terrain in which Papandreou is trying to reconcile his old unrelenting anti-Western, and inconsistent, proclamations--which are still being adhered to devoutly by his colleagues on the Left--with pragmatic assessments of the moment and modern attitudes about Eurosocialism. It is a difficult effort, especially since the KKE is vigilant, proclaiming daily that "without the KKE no change can happen" and that "national issues cannot tolerate falsification."

As the EPIKAIRA has written already, the election-campaign struggle will revolve around the national issues and in general around matters of foreign policy. From the beginning the ND has tried to force the political contest to take this turn. And PASOK did not resist, even though for it domestic issues made a better objective.

On the government's side there was finally an official embracing--with the interview by Rallis to I VRADYNI on Monday--of Averof's slogan that the coming elections will not decide between parties but on the form of the regime. The "elucidators" of the ND are calling on Papandreou to define precisely his position on the issues of NATO, the bases, the EEC, and so forth. And they are labeling

as "nebulous positions" the declarations by Papandreou on dismantling the bases "by gradual and cautious steps, so as to safeguard the defensive capability of the country." The same propagandists are asking Papandreou to tell the people what will happen if we again find ourselves outside NATO. How our army will be equipped, when arms are being sold on the market at astronomical prices. How we are to dispute the claim raised by Turkey on overseeing the Aegean on behalf of the Alliance, and so forth.

They are asking PASOK in addition to make up its mind on this: Since the bases are "bases of death," why is not their immediate abolition promised, instead of reference being made to "timetables" and "preconditions"?

Just When, Exactly?

When exactly will the elections take place? This question is preoccupying not only the parties and the politicians but also the common voters. At the beginning of the week there were reports that by Sunday the date of the elections will have been established, through contacts between Karamanlis-Rallis and Papandreou. But this report did not reduce the guessing, which has become enormously widespread.

As a rule the Chamber of Deputies must be dissolved on 19 November, when its 4-year term of office is completed, and elections must be held within 1 month--that is, by 19 December. Typically the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies before this date would be considered "premature" and would require "justification."

Of course, nobody will raise "objections" if the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies happens "a little before" the expiration of its term of office, especially since the opposition is calling for "elections now, in July." But from this point on, the predictions begin.

So far, the following dates have been stipulated, with an air of "being in the know":

First, the SYNGROTIMA, for 20 September.

The KATHIMERINI, for 18 October.

Two other newspapers, for 11 October.

A governmental figure intimated last week that elections will be held at the beginning of October. And Rallis is reputed to have stated that he does not desire to surprise anyone nor keep his political adversaries in suspense. Consequently he will announce the date of the elections "in good time."

The Favorable Moment

At two "informal" meetings of government figures--including ministers as well--there was an exchange of views on the most "suitable" date for the elections. Among other things, the following were proposed:

They should be held at about the end of the deadline--that is, in December--when the problems facing the Mitterand administration will have emerged and when there will be auspicious reactions in Greece.

The elections should take place immediately, in August, so that we will not have any new complications in the domestic sector.

They should be held after the general summer vacations but before the first public-utility bills are posted, with their increased rates.

October is the month for student demonstrations and labor mobilizations. The elections should be held on the first Sunday of this month.

September is the month of "affluence" in Greece. Prices for fruits largely decline, and the problems of winter have not yet emerged. There is general euphoria. They should be held in September....

A minister who was present rejected these considerations as "calculations of African politicians," and he stated his conviction that the Greek people are not influenced any longer by seasonal events when they want to vote for a party.

In any case, it should be kept in mind that if the Chamber of Deputies has not been dissolved by 5 October (the first Monday in October), the entire membership must assemble in a fifth session--something which will be unprecedented in our parliamentary annals. And it should be noted that the government already has scheduled for the full functioning of the Parliamentary Recess Committee until 2 October.

12114

CSO: 4621/44

PASOK LABOR UNION POLICY ANALYZED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 12 Aug 81 pp 3, 12

[Article by Finance Minister Miltiadis Evert: "PASOK and Syndicalism"]

[Text] In order to assess PASOK's policy in the area of syndicalism (trade unionism) we must bear in mind certain facts and lessons we have learned from the experiences of over a century.

First, syndicalism is not a political or ideological movement. Its objective is to improve the working conditions of the working people through wages and salaries, hours and conditions of work, relief, insurance, etc. Its invincible strength derives precisely from these activities. Those who underestimate them or consider them secondary and who use them as a pretext for the promotion of political or ideological objectives are making a serious mistake.

Second, a strong and effective syndicalist movement can exist only in democratic states. The totalitarian and dictatorial regimes strangle it.

Third, syndicalism provides meaningful services to the working people only as long as it is under their control; only as long as it remains independent and acts independently of the political parties. To the extent it becomes factionalized, it wastes its energy on alien tasks and serves objectives unrelated or even contrary to the interests of the working people.

Fourth, in a democratic state the working people can exercise their political will through the political organizations, which, moreover, show an ideological homogeneity. They should never do so through their syndicalist organizations which do not have political and ideological homogeneity. They consist of persons of different political views and they are linked together only through their direct trade or branch interests. Therefore, those who succeed in assuming the administration of their organization and put it in the service of their political party are acting in a way contrary to those of their colleagues who do not belong to the same political front. They simply distort their will; they support a policy they actually oppose; and they dilute the syndicalist movement. Such behavior is both undemocratic and indecent.

Inconsistent Positions

PASOK is not ignorant of the harm factionalization causes to the syndicalist movement. It knows very well that many working people and their representatives

want their organizations to be their own independent organs and not branches of party mechanisms. But PASOK is not at all willing to respect the independence and autonomy of the syndicalist organizations and little cares about the harm it causes them in its effort to bring them under its control. Like all Marxist movements it has a messianic notion about its mission; it believes that the implementation of its...cosmogonic program is such an important event that it is worth sacrificing everything for. But in its desire to displease those opposing the fractionalization of syndicalism, it PASOK follows hypocritical tactics in its effort to reconcile the irreconcilables. Thus its positions in the syndicalism sector appear inconsistent and contradictory. For instance, PASOK warns that: "Now that the struggle for change has reached its peak, the identification of the political parties and the trade unions and societies tends to break up the unity of the syndicalist movement, to stop its mass expansion and to undergrade its liveliness and dynamism" (speech by Papandreou to the Sixth Session of PASOK's Central Committee). But in the same breath he proclaims:

"PASOK's struggling political positions fulfill their objectives only and only when they conquer the masses; when they become the reason for exerting influence as catalysts and speed up the developments in the assertive struggles of the working people through their syndicalist organizations--an indispensable guarantee and a determining weapon in the struggle for socialist change" ("Duties of a PASOK Member," page 15).

In other words, while PASOK on the one hand is against fractionalization of the trade unions, on the other hand it fractionalizes and uses them as "a determining weapon" for capturing and maintaining power.

PASOK speaks about the "organizational autonomy" of the syndicalist movement and not simply about autonomy. But, one way or another, it cannot abolish the organizational autonomy. Nor is it in its interest to do so. But it abolishes the true autonomy of the movement when its party cadres, camouflaged as syndicalist cadres, are elected in the administrations of the trade unions whose activities they orient toward PASOK's policy.

Marxist Syndicalism

But as concerns the syndicalist movement, what is in store for PASOK if it ever comes to power? Its official pronouncements give us a clear warning. As an opposition party PASOK is using the syndicalist organizations it controls for inciting and maintaining social turmoil. It instigates them continually to make demands, to declare strikes, to hold marches and demonstrations. It goes overboard when they make demands no matter how unreasonable or untimely they are. It does not make a distinction between the public and private sector of the economy. It incites most of the labor strikes in the public sector. Yet it does not intend to tolerate similar activities as government. The trade unions will then become the means for the implementation of the government policy and will give up any and all demands. In his book "Transition to Socialism," Papandreou writes on page 73:

"The organizations and associations participate actively in forming the national program for economic and social development. At the same time, they assist the demands of the working people. It should be noted that in socialized enterprises dependent work (the employer-worker relationship, that is) will be abolished.

Therefore, the syndicalist claims in the form we know them today are limited only to the nonsocialized sector."

If we put aside the spicy propaganda of this statement we can see that in essence PASOK aims at abolishing the syndicalist rights of the working people, which means that the working people cannot turn against a Marxist state because it is "their state." Therefore, they cannot go on strike and protest or make demands against... themselves.

As a matter of fact in order to exercise effective control over the syndicalist movement, PASOK aims at depriving the working people of the possibility of establishing unions in places where the existing ones do not represent them. In his book "Government Policy Guidelines" (page 60) Papandreu says:

"Syndicalism is reorganized in order for the unions to truly represent the working people. In this context the aim will be to have only one union in every place of work. The existence of many unions fighting each other in an effort to get more special privileges for their members, is against the general interests of the working people. The objective also will be to have in every sector of work (for example, construction activity, transportation, food industries) one trade union to which all working people will belong so that solutions to every problem will be possible and effective."

The truth of the matter is that it will be possible to control effectively the working people. For one to understand what is hidden behind this hypocritical statement, it suffices to bear in mind that PASOK as the opposition party created its own trade unions whenever it was unable to place under its control the already existing ones. But if it ever becomes government it will force those unions it does not control to merge with those it controls. Such mergers, of course, cannot be made without force. We do not believe that Papandreu is so naive as to believe that the working people will hasten to comply with his every desire. Nor do we believe that the new opposition--if it is allowed to exist--will support his policy and will avoid using the trade unions the way PASOK is using them today.

His theory that the working people will have no reason to strike against a PASOK-Marxist state is only for naive people especially in the face of the startling events in Poland. A Marxist state has been established in that country more than 30 years ago. Yet, the Polish working people in the cities and rural areas--with the support of the students--have for months now been carrying on a desperate struggle to regain the independence and autonomy of their organizations, to regain, that is, rights which are safeguarded and guaranteed in our country. This struggle of theirs has blown into the air the myth that the Marxist regime is "the state of the workers and farmers" and that the Marxist parties are the class representatives of the working people.

What is of primary importance to the working people is not in whose hands the production means are but what possibilities they themselves have of controlling the employer whether such employer is a private citizen or the state. PASOK aims at completely depriving them of such a possibility by the communist inspired theory that the interests of the working people absolutely identify with the interests of a Papandreu government.

CARRILLO CRITICIZED FOR PERSONALIZING PARTY DIFFERENCES

Madrid LA CALLE in Spanish 28 Jul-3 Aug 81 pp 12-13

[Article by Cesar Alonso de los Rios: "Carrillo in Check"]

[Text] From illusion to crisis. Of those four individuals who toasted the legalization of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] with champagne in the historic photograph, two are no longer in the communist ranks--Tamames and Triana. They were the two PCE men in the Madrid Junta in those days when a democratic break seemed impossible. They were two of the names which characterized the symbols of the identity of a more than workers' party. Tamames and Triana, like others, represent the tip of the iceberg of the mass of professionals who have been disengaging themselves from this interclass mass called the PCE. For this reason these two names are of importance, for they represent a process which the PCE congress will either seize by the horns, or we will witness the professional decapitalization of the party as more of the intellectual cadres rally to Francoism. This is the question as this tense congress approaches. It is not only a problem of image, but underlies the party model under discussion, an internal party practice and the policy which has been pursued in these recent years.

The illusion had to do with the legalization of the PCE. It was a party which had two main supports: a powerful trade union organization and a group of professional people enviable for a party which had just emerged from clandestinity and repression. The former had a slogan, somewhat pedantic but very ambitious and realistic--alliance between the forces of labor and culture. That party was able to recognize its interest in an equally ambitious and imaginative strategy--Eurocommunism. Carrillo defined it. He wrote a book on the subject. He asserted it with more decision than Berlinguer himself, and went further than he did, at least formally, in his criticism of the Soviet Union and "real socialism." Carrillo was the bete noir of the Soviets and the satellite countries. Carrillo's challenge of the model of socialism was profound and determined with regard to the independence of PCE policy from the USSR. The foundations for a projected socialist society were laid, with freedoms and liberty both in the process and in the goal.

The tool would be to a large extent a party which would reflect within it the socialist and democratic goals.

From the illusion of those days to today's crisis. The PCE approaches this congress with profound unease. The reasons? A sharp decline in membership, the bleeding of the professional sectors, limited parliamentary representation and the fear that this

will not increase but even decline. Unease because of the lack of internal debate and the existence of bureaucratic methods. A loss of strength in trade union life. The very identity of the party is in crisis. There are those who not only question the Leninist model as it has come down to us today, but the very viability of the communist parties in Europe. An interdict has been placed upon democratic centralism and the need to recognize various opinion trends is defended. Above all, there are charges that the Eurocommunist dialogue is being hindered by a bureaucratic practice which denies it in fact. And this practice is associated with a specific leadership which is in large part regarded as exhausted and ineffective, and for which the defense of Eurocommunism seems a personal or collective defense.

Between the illusion and the crisis there has clearly been a precarious political transition with a high cost. The specter of a coup d'etat became a reality in the physical form of machine guns and tanks on 23 February. The strike and the economic crisis not only placed the trade unions with communist hegemony in a difficult position, but also revealed the primitive face of a part of the party which had been forgotten because of the Eurocommunist proclamations. A primitive face which can take the form of prosovietism or trade union maximalism, and which in any case places a part of the blame for the costs of the crisis on Eurocommunism.

The response of the leadership of the PCE, or a part of it, to this complex and multiple crisis is sometimes oversimplistic. It reasserts Eurocommunism to conjure away any kind of challenge on the one hand or the other, which I will refrain from terming leftist and rightist.

From the point of view of the spectator, of society, let us say, this defensive response might seem correct. So it seemed after the Congress of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia]. The major battle focused on the struggle between the Eurocommunists and the prosoviet faction. The PSUC Congress had a scandalizing effect in that it formally eliminated Eurocommunism. Thus those who simplified the battle between the Eurocommunists and the pro-Soviets, whether or not encouraged by the Russian embassy, seemed to be right.

The PSUC Congress had a scandalizing effect beyond our frontiers. It was a demonstration to society that Eurocommunism was something very unstable or else a simple tactic which the weight of the crisis had in the end pushed aside. The later adjustments (textual reaffirmation of Eurocommunism and the expulsion of Pere Ardiaca from the presidency) have served to place an interdict on democratic credibility. In any case, many say, the PSUC proceeded democratically and in exemplary fashion. The reversal was the result of certain expedient considerations and some problems of image. And also of certain relationships established between the PSUC and the PCE. But society's reading is very simple: "Carrillo has subdued the Catalans."

But this simple division formulated within the PCE as a goal and formulated in the eyes of society as a "slogan" has in recent days ceased to have any meaning. However, the challenge to the leadership of the PCE did not come basically from the prosoviet sector, but from those who are consistently Eurocommunist. In their view, renewal of the leadership is the definitive battle force. And not only in Madrid, when a couple of months ago a manifesto signed by 250 professional people and some workers' cadres appeared but received a very cool reception from the leadership and was published not in the pages of MUNDO OBRERO but elsewhere, in EUSKADI, for example. Here the victory of the nationalist Eurocommunists headed by

Roberto Lertxundi takes such problems for granted, since one can no longer satisfy the possibility of a rupture. In Valencia, the sectors most prone to red tape and bureaucracy have challenged party control to the point that dismissals include the likes of Pilar Brabo, Emerit Bono and Ernest Garcia.

Thus, then, a trend has taken shape which challenges the leadership from Eurocommunist positions, charging that it is leading the party into a constant contradiction between discussion and practice.

Carrillo is challenged by the Eurocommunists. Not by all of them, certainly, but not by a negligible minority either. They constitute a group which, if lost to the PCE, would leave it in a very poor position to carry out its Eurocommunist strategy, that is to achieve a growing presence in Spanish society, rather than the workers' movement alone. And is definitively important in terms of improvement over the last elections and for the administration of those portions of power which the PCE has in its hands today, specifically, the municipalities.

Throughout these days of internal debate, the press had reflected the froth of the personality struggle. Battles for ideas always end in a discussion of personalities. There is no reason to be surprised by this. This is the case in the PCE and in all parties. To expect something different from the communists would be the equivalent of asserting their alien and abnormal nature.

It must be noted that Carrillo personally was never an issue when the renewal of the leadership was in question. On the contrary, with monotonous insistence, the advocates of renewal stress that it required Carrillo to remain as secretary general. "Carrillo must head the renewal policy." This was one theme. It should be noted, moreover, that this was not a question of generation, but of efficiency. But as the congress comes closer, the subject has become more personalized.

Already, when journalists (the "bourgeois press") began to take up the subject of the heirs to power some time ago, obviously a morbid subject in a communist party, Carrillo began to give answers such as that to the effect that he would not mind resigning in order to engage in more gratifying work than politics, but that it was impossible since the party would cease to be Eurocommunist and would follow the Cunhal line. This response, if Santiago Carrillo is right, leaves the party in a very poor position. For what kind of group, what kind of intellectual group in a mature party is it that would change its strategy radically with the resignation of one leader, however valuable he might be? It seems to me that the harshest criticism which could be made of the PCE, in any case the harshest analysis, is implicit in Carrillo's response.

In recent days, as the renewal trend has strengthened, Santiago Carrillo has not hesitated to discredit its representatives in the harshest terms, while at the same time making the issue a personal one and one of power. He has accused them of being frustrated because they were not elected deputies like some of their class colleagues who, without having waged such a struggle in the Franco era (an ironic point), won seats in the parliament from the ranks of the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]. He has stressed the elitist nature of that body. Both Carrillo and Sanchez Montero explained the result of at least one vote at the Madrid Conference in terms of the fact that the workers had to leave the gathering and go home to sleep, because they had to work the next morning, while the professional politicians could stay on into

the night. The truth is that only the political professional can stay on into the early morning hours without inconvenience to them personally or to their work. This charge raises a truly serious and now traditional issue: the campaign to discredit intellectual workers as compared to manual workers. On the other hand, Carrillo has not hesitated to call the renewal faction "Stalinist" because it imposed its choices where it was in the majority. And he has even pilloried the highest communist authority in the representatives from Madrid. I must say that I really blushed at reading these passages. Finally, he has frequently pursued a deliberate course in saying that a large number of the advocates of renewal dream of going over to the PSOE. I would say that in this way he is driving them toward it. At one time, Santiago Carrillo used the pages of INTERVIU to destroy Tamames politically when he was still a part of the PCE leadership. It is possible that Tamames was thinking of leaving the party. It is possible that he no longer felt he could stay in the party. I would be much more interested in looking into this point than any other.

The worrisome thing is that all of this is regarded as "normal" in politics and is so regarded by the so-called "officialist" faction. However, I believe that Santiago Carrillo has the right and the duty to defend his position and attack those of his opponents. And I believe he has a right to do so fervently. If passion has a place in any activity, it is in politics. But always within the framework of political discussion. However, one gets the impression that Carrillo only sees those who disagree with his policy as careerists. He discredited thousands in the renewal faction when he said that they were not even pursuing the political intent of Tamames, who in the final analysis had a clear choice between the PSOE and the UCD [Democratic Center Union]. On the other hand, he has criticized the general debate on the basis that one should not lose time in internal battles when democracy is in danger and this would contribute further to instability. This statement leads to paralysis or to coercive discipline, to a permanent state of emergency in a country which has not eliminated the threat of a coup or of involution.

In recent statements to LA HOJA DEL LUNES, Santiago Carrillo has stated that what is at issue is power in the party. It seems as if Carrillo may have wanted to raise the issue of his personality throughout this process, when as I have said, the renewal faction has on repeated occasions confirmed Carrillo's personal continuation as secretary general. Why is this? Possibly because Santiago Carrillo has personal links with a large part of the party apparatus which for its part is in question, and is being challenged. And in this process he wanted on the one hand to appeal to the more timid sectors to face up to the problem, and on the other, to appeal to the patriotic feelings of a considerable part of sociological communism.

Thus, then, if what is in question is not Carrillo personally, the issue has been posed in such a way that many members, professional cadres and some leaders who constitute a decisive faction in a party which is not a workers' party nor a minority one may be alienated. Or that this party can effect a real alliance of the forces of labor and culture, which is what is at stake in this congress.

PCE REGIONAL CONFERENCE LEGITIMIZES FACTIONAL VIEWS

Madrid LA CALLE in Spanish 21-27 Jul 81 pp 16-18

[Article by Carlos Elordi: "The PCE in Madrid--The Big Surprise"]

[Text] The legitimizing of factional views was the bombshell at the Seventh PCE [Spanish Communist Party] Conference in Madrid. The result is not very important from a statutory point until the 10th congress also approves it. However, it is of not inconsiderable political importance, if only because it was imposed against the explicit will of the communist leadership. On the other hand, the tense atmosphere and sharp clashes among the various Eurocommunist sectors confirm a substantial change in the polemic within the PCE.

"We are dealing with the future of the party. If we do not change, we may become a rubber stamp party." This concept, set forth to the plenum by Jaime Sartorius and reiterated frequently throughout the discussion, serves to summarize the focus of the concern of the renewal sector of the PCE in Madrid. Another view, defended by the political secretary of the Madrid organization, Simon Sanchez Montero, one of the historic leaders of the PCE, represents the other side in this impassioned debate. "Trends, fashions or currents of thought--whatever they may be called--are not good. What is happening at this seventh conference is but a forerunner of what could happen if these factions win approval."

This warning from Sanchez Montero, which was challenged by dozens of arguments, was not to be accepted by the majority at the meeting. Some 213 of the delegates would vote yes to an amendment of the party bylaws by virtue of which the existence of factional views within the PCE will be recognized, while 155 voted against it. The new text reads as follows: "Within the framework of respect for the bylaw, factional views within the party will be legitimized in order to give expression to, to normalize and incorporate these various political views existing within it, which will enjoy full freedom of expression in its organs and publications, as well as in any other communication organ, both individually and collectively."

This was the bombshell at the Madrid Communist Party conference. And because of the importance of the organization involved, because of the nature of the discussion--in which Santiago Carrillo participated directly, and because of the time at which it occurred, the echoes of this development will affect the entire Communist Party. The discussion in this point will be repeated at the 10th congress, which will begin

next week. This is the body which must approve of or reject the factional views. Presumably, the majority of the delegates will vote against it, although it will be interesting to see how many supporters the proposal wins. In any case, what occurred in Madrid last week reveals the existence of basic factions of great importance in the communist ranks.

The discussion had an extremely inward focus. The statutory and organizational issues were the heart of the discussion. The problem of internal democracy, and on another level, that of renewal, constituted the freezing point in the internal clash within the third party of Spain, which is suffering from a serious membership crisis, major organizational and operational problems, and even the need for a definition of its political space in the current situation. Substantial sectors critical of the current practices of the leadership agree on the assessment that internal democracy, in its various aspects, represents the first and essential step toward dealing with the other political problems.

It was known in advance that the discussion would be tense, because the debates in the organizations on the base level, from which the delegates and the positions to be defended at the conference would emerge, were tense. The representative levels of communist membership, which in recent years has declined from 30,000 to 17,000 in Madrid, are the group, district and federation. On all these levels, the proposals and discussions about democratization were at the heart of the debate. The well-known "document of the 252" released a month ago and criticized by the PCE leadership, which blocked its publication in MUNDO OBRERO, was the main guideline for the polemic and the text on the basis of which positions were adopted. Some of those who signed it charged, before and during the conference, that there was a witchhunt, subtle repression of those who endorsed the positions defended in the document.

It was soon seen that the positions of the signatories had won numerically significant support, and that its supporters at the conference would be a sizable faction. Despite the various levels of filtration which the specific mechanics of communist party representation involves, and which curiously favored this view in this early stage, a substantial group of "renewal" delegates would be present at the conference. They came basically from the organizations in the middle-class residential zones. The majority of them were higher and middle-level professional people, plus some representatives of the workers.

The weight of these views would be numerically confirmed at the end of the second day of the conference. These delegates urged abstention from the vote on the report of the outgoing provincial committee drafted by Simon Sanchez Montero. And the report was approved on the basis of only 208 affirmative votes--47 percent of the total, in other words less than half--as compared to 85 negative votes and 153 abstentions. Why did these delegates abstain? "We agree with the general political postulates, but we reject the portion which analyzes the internal party debate and in particular the treatment given the critical faction." They could vote neither against nor for it. They were prepared to confirm the Eurocommunist orientation of Sanchez Montero's report, but they could not approve of his criticisms, which were in large part directed against them. The assessments of the report were termed "Manichaeian, disqualifying and the expression of a monolithism which has not yet been abandoned," set forth in language "suited to the Third International." The renewal movement, as it could be deduced from the document of the 252, was described in the report as a "cancer which could destroy us if it is not eliminated." The

activity of this group was stigmatized as little less than factional, with the terrible damning connotation this concept has within the Communist Party, in which factionalism is equivalent in practice to activities against the party.

Two Types of Eurocommunism?

In addition, the abstention avoided a certain confusion. The "hard line" sector, which calls itself the "communist left" and is frequently and perhaps abusively called "prosoviet," was to oppose the report. The "renewal" advocates wanted to separate themselves from that sector. They were radically opposed to "unnatural pacts" with those who reject the basic suppositions of Eurocommunism, which in the view of the former is the basis for the demand for democratization and renewal.

Their position was endorsed by 35 percent of the delegates. Some advocates of renewal, as a part of the RTVE [Directorate General of Spanish Radio Broadcasting and Television] might well have done, irritated by Sanchez Montero's defense of his own report, in which he reiterated and intensified the initial content, voted no. Their numerical strength was confirmed. But this strength was not to be reflected in the higher body, the provincial committee, which the conference had to elect. The essential mechanism of the elections in the Communist Party, which logically represent the final expression following internal debate, is the candidates' commission, a specifically communist mechanism. A number of delegates representing each federation, along with representatives of the preceding provincial committee, draft an official list, that which systematically has every chance of winning. Whoever controls the candidates' commission wins the elections. And the tense battle for the structuring of this committee prior to the conference produced a clear result. The Eurocommunists termed "officialists," those who were to vote yes on Simon Sanchez Montero's report, the sector which, despite certain sometimes more than minor differences within their ranks, defend the concept of democratization and renewal, "but without haste," gained control of the candidates' commission. And thus entrenched, and with an attitude which one renewal advocate termed "sweeping," they would only allow the inclusion of ten renewal advocates in a total of 55 on the official list. To some in the renewal faction this seemed like an insult, and for almost all it was unacceptable. Some proposed immediate withdrawal of all the candidates. Others said it was necessary to try to get the plenum to listen to their reasoning in open discussion. A number of the so-called "officialists" made no effort to conceal their disgust with the narrow-mindedness of the members of the candidates' commission. Its attitude seemed to them exaggerated, and they believed that in any case, this could only aggravate the tension and the internal problems of the PCE. In the end, after an interruption of an hour--which many saw as an excuse for attempted negotiations, which began timidly and were cut short because they were unacceptable to important figures in the officialist sector, those presiding at the conference indicated that the voting procedure would begin. There was no opportunity for discussion and the mass withdrawal occurred. In an unprecedented spectacle in the Communist Party, the 10 renewal advocates, 2 delegates close to the position of the "hard-line faction," which had not won a single place on the official list for its most outstanding leaders, and 3 other candidates, initially termed officialists, announced their withdrawal. Another 55 included on the unofficial lists endorsed their move. There followed more than 50 2-minute statements in which one argument was repeated: "There has been intolerance. Those who drafted the lists believe they control the party. This will not democratize the Communist Party." They asked for a blank vote. Out of 227 voters, 214 cast blank votes. Julio Setien won the most votes, 200, with a total of 443 delegates present. A number of candidates were added to the committee list with fewer than 90 votes.

The blank votes on Saturday, following the abstentions the preceding day, led to a new peak of tension at the conference. Hours before this occurred, a number of amendments, that recognizing factional groups and others along the same line, had been approved by a majority, although a narrow one, in a working commission. Simon Sanchez Montero had spoken repeatedly during this discussion, reiterating his arguments of the preceding day. "The party is losing influence due to the internal battles," the former secretary general is reported to have said, having earlier announced his decision to abandon his work in the Madrid organization to devote himself entirely to the parliament.

Carrillo Against the Factions

Three major points were on the agenda for the Sunday session. The speech by the secretary general of the PCE--some viewed this as likely to calm the atmosphere, the plenary discussion on the factional groups and the official nomination of the delegates to the 10th congress--the second electoral episode at the congress, and one with regard to which an adjustment of its criteria on the part of the dominant sector in the candidates' commission was expected.

Contrary to the hopes of some, Carrillo's speech further heightened the tense atmosphere. His address, of which we are publishing a considerable portion, focused on the internal problem and whether or not to approve factions. Such viewpoints as that of Eduardo Mangada, first lieutenant mayor and one of the signatories of the "document of the 252," were widely shared by the renewal faction and some went even further in their criticism. "This was an unnecessary and unjust 'club' causing further schism instead of uniting," it was said. The view of this sector, which was later to triumph on the amendment concerning factional groups, was that Carrillo was excessive in his judgment of these groups and unjustly condemned those defending them, "accusing us of creating a second party."

Following the approval of the amendment--the opposition was defended at the plenary session by Adolfo Pinedo, the new political secretary in Madrid, the official list of delegates to the congress was announced. Forty-nine of the total of 165 were affiliated with the "renewal" position, in other words about 25 percent, a figure more consistent with the proportional weight of their views. There was no challenge and the list was approved by a majority.

At the conclusion of the meeting, after four exhausting sessions ending in almost all cases in the wee hours of the morning, some of the officialist delegates accused those in the renewal faction of "having divided the party" by approving the amendment. The dislike of factional opinions, so obvious in the case of the leadership and Carrillo himself, is regarded as "greatly exaggerated" by the renewal faction members, who make no secret of the real importance of the result of the vote on the subject. But they stress that this importance lies above all in the disruption of a state of inertia, in the demonstration that it is possible to triumph over the officialist positions by means of the vote, that the path to democratization is hard and will be full of battles, but that it is possible to win some. And also in the very meaning of the amendment: if we had had recognized factions before, a part of the membership exodus could have been avoided," it was said at the plenum, although in any case it is stressed--and the text itself confirms this--that the opinion-organized group-faction analogy frequently quoted is a false one.

The difficult Madrid conference, at which the discussions of the general line were not as important as expected, serves to confirm a new fact in the panorama of conflict within the PCE: when Carrillo and other communist leaders warned of the "prosoviet threat" some months ago, at the conclusion of the Fifth Congress of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia], everything suggested that the internal battle would be waged between the "hard-line" faction and the Eurocommunists. The development of internal debate in Madrid, Andalusia and Valencia, as well as in the Basque country, served to confirm that there is another clash equally or perhaps more virulent, within the majority sector itself which defends the Eurocommunist postulates. While the "prosoviet threat" seems to be of smaller dimensions than those indirectly suggested by the leaders of the PCE, Santiago Carrillo sees a greater danger--and his speech on Sunday confirms this--to those who define themselves as "Eurocommunist toward the outside, but with an inward focus as well."

5157

CSO: 3110/133

EUROCOMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF PCE AS CONGRESS APPROACHES

Madrid LA CALLE in Spanish 28 Jul-3 Aug 81 p 17

[Article by Carlos Alonso Zaldivar: "Salute to the 10th Congress"]

[Text] On balance, the development of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] between the 9th and 10th congresses has not been brilliant. There are positive elements, such as the electoral improvement in the 1979 legislative elections and the greater success in the later municipal elections, the pact with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], which made an outstanding communist showing in the town councils possible, and the overall results of that presence. There were certain parliamentary initiatives which it was possible to carry forward despite harsh isolation. But there was also a reduction in communist influence in the trade union movement and in other mass movements. The excellent relations with the government ended in 1979. On the international level, the anticommunist ambitions of the United States and also the winds blowing in Moscow, exerted pressure against the independent PCE policy. The comforting breeze recently has been that from the direction of France.

This is a harsh assessment, not one which should lead to despair. If a serious evaluation is made within the framework of the existing circumstances, it can be termed quite worthy and justifying the strengthening of the incentives for struggle by Eurocommunism. If this seems optimistic today, it is because there is another clearly negative assessment when it comes to internal party matters.

The membership decline exceeds 50,000. The quality of the membership has deteriorated noticeably. Territorial extension has brought with it serious losses of professional people and intellectuals. Relations between the base and the leadership are less transparent and direct than they were. Serious tensions between the center and the periphery have developed. The integration of trade union cadres and public officials in regular party life has not been resolved. The party press has suffered a serious decline.

When it comes to explaining all of the above, three different types of explanation arise. First of all, there are those who blame all of the evils on the endorsement of Eurocommunism. This criterion prevailed at the Fifth Congress of the PSUC [Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia]. Secondly, there are those who, rejecting this, have been saying that the problems of the PCE, including its internal ones, are the problems of Spanish democracy, in other words, their causes lie outside the party. The thesis concerning the party presented at this congress is based on this interpretation. And finally, there are those who, without denying external factors, also

stress as a cause of the problems and the limits on party action internal difficulties which must be resolved if the Eurocommunist policy we proclaim is to be implemented fully. Those who share the first viewpoint represent a minority of the delegates to the 10th congress, but it would be dangerous to overlook the fact that their explanations are those easiest to promulgate among the greater part of the party base. The other two viewpoints taken together represent the vast majority. Perhaps this is why there is a risk that the congress will focus on a sectarian struggle between the two. If this should happen, it would mean an error probably fatal to the PCE.

It would be fatal because Eurocommunism, instead of being further confirmed and established, as it could be, would be stripped and weakened to the benefit of those who are not Eurocommunists.

It would be fatal because the frontiers between the two Eurocommunist sectors are falsely defined. A backward-oriented discussion has been established through the use of personal and formal symbols. The highest symbol for the one faction is Santiago Carrillo, but we others neither are nor want to appear to be anti-Carrillo. This is not the problem of the party nor our problem. What we want is to democratize and renew the party in order better to pursue the Eurocommunist policy. We do not need nor do we want to define ourselves in terms of personal references. Perhaps for this reason, as well as our own errors, the cunning of others and the need for the press to simplify, we are faced with two false idols: existing trends and the desire to do away with the "old guard." Institutionalizing the factions will not resolve the basic question, which is developing a more Eurocommunist party. If the polemic is focused here, the result may even be the creation of greater difficulties. What is indeed essential in order to begin to resolve this urgent and complex problem is to guarantee all communists, that is to say each and every one, the right of individual and collective expression, inside and outside the party, and in its press organs, provided this right is not used for frontal opposition to those specific political decisions which have already been regularly and democratically adopted by the majority. And it also seems to me equally essential to establish the duty of the leadership to inform the entire party not only about the agreements reached, but also about the general nature of the disagreements which may have occurred during the decision-making process.

As to the intention to "liquidate the old guard," the only real aspect of this which exists, or rather existed, was a rebel outburst by someone which could only be repeated today from outside the party. What does exist is the need for this congress to provide adequate leadership in the basic areas of party work which have lacked it and that the work be distributed on the basis of political identification and capacity, setting personal alliances aside.

I believe that the democratization and renewal of the party today involves these things and something more: the strengthening of a ready will for party tasks, rejecting dogmatism, stubbornness and complacency, extreme respect for the party base, its criticisms, experience and needs, a determination to recover as many lost comrades as possible and to encourage better membership with more individual commitment and fewer orders. The congress can only do all of this in an indicative fashion, by approving a thesis concerning the party which assumes this attitude and bearing these concepts in mind when the Central Committee is elected.

If we want a healthy congress which will result in a united and renewed party which is more Eurocommunist, we should not wage a war on false frontiers and with improvised identities. If we do so, whichever faction has most delegates will win, but Eurocommunism will lose. The most intransigent faction will never be the most Eurocommunist, and that which should be most flexible in compromise is that best able to do this.

5157

CSO: 3110/133

UCD-PSOE AGREEMENT ON AUTONOMIES CRITICIZED BY PCE ORGAN

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 14-20 Aug 81 pp 14-15

[Article by Manuel Torres: "Agreement on Autonomies: An Idol With Clay Feet"]

[Text] As our readers know, on 31 July 1981 the government and the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] signed the "agreements on autonomies" after obliging the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] to leave the negotiations. Last week we already gave an account of some aspects of this surprising twoway discussion. To fill in some details we talked to Carlos Alonso Zaldivar, member of the PCE's negotiating committee on the issue of autonomies.

The day of 31 July was to be an agitated day on 3 Castellana, the place where the autonomy talks among the four most important national parties were just held. Theoretically, everything could have transpired as in many of the other sessions being held during the past few weeks, since nothing had been said officially about a deadline for the negotiations.

But for the communist representatives, the surprises began in the morning. The night before, following Felipe Gonzalez's third meeting with Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, the government and the PSOE had agreed on the issue of the members of Cortes. And both sides placed it on the carpet.

As if a miracle were involved, the economic issue also emerged from the impasse. For entire weeks the communists had been demanding figures and, lo and behold, figures in abundance now started to appear.

"The government had undertaken 60 quantitative surveys on the matter."

And by way of surprise, the figures were discussed in a special room; a meeting attended by Laureano Lazaro on behalf of the PCE.

But as if a mystery novel were involved--a serialized one, incidentally--Martin Villa met with the communist delegation fairly late in the evening. The issue was very simple: Was the PCE ready to sign the LOAPA [Organic Harmonization Law of the Autonomous Process].

The communists said no, repeated that they had taken that stand since the start, from the time when they took cognizance of the Garcia Enterria report which Santiago Carrillo himself had communicated to Calvo Sotelo 2 days earlier, namely, that LOAPA has many unconstitutional provisions in it.

"One of the rapporteurs suggested during the negotiations that before the LOAPA was presented to the Cortes [parliament] it would be appropriate to consult the Constitutional Tribunal."

The minister of territorial administration then said that the matter of the agreements on autonomies is like lentils, that if they are signed at all they should be signed in their entirety whereas if the LOAPA is not signed nothing is signed. The communists argued that it is feasible to separate the LOAPA from the rest of the negotiations, that in the last analysis the LOAPA has to be approved by the Cortes and that there, theoretically, it can be amended. Or will no amendments to the LOAPA be approved in the Cortes?

The matter was settled all the same. The government and the PSOE had already taken a stance and, politely, the communists were ousted from the negotiations. Finally things ended up as they had begun--with a semblance of a coalition government which, if it had really existed, would have facilitated more productive and unambiguous negotiations.

Posture of the Communists

After these accidents and incidents, it is appropriate to ask oneself what will be the PCE's posture vis-a-vis the issue of autonomies.

"As regards the political agreement the PCE insists on provisions like those already arrived at in the negotiations."

Some positions agreed upon among the four participating parties in the negotiations and which constitute the basis for the solution of the autonomies problems existing in this country refer to the geography of the autonomies, their schedule, and the rationality of the changeovers--positions which the PCE has insistently held as well as the need for an understanding from early 1980.

But even though the PCE will fulfill those agreements achieved at the negotiating table, a few points which were not completely clarified at that time give rise, in the light of what finally occurred, to more than serious ambiguities--for example, the issue of the Canary Islands.

When the PSOE and the government were not yet in agreement on every provision, Socialists and communists held concurrent attitudes on this subject so that an agreement outlined among all the parties involved in the negotiations and which is to be introduced in the Cortes at the same time as the Autonomy Statute, an organic law based on Article 150 (2) of the Constitution, for which reason the authority conferred on the Canaries would take these islands' specific characteristics into account.

"We communists request the determination of the strict substance of the law, that is, of the matter to which reference is to be made."

The absence of the communists from the final negotiations seems to have shelved the issue. But the PCE is ready to demand again what was agreed upon at the time.

There Is No More Money Than Before

The communists do not concur with the figure finalized by the government and the PSOE for the Interterritorial Compensation Fund. The sum of 180 billion pesetas is 70,000 pesetas less than the PCE proposed.

The creation of the Interterritorial Compensation Fund does not mean that "more money" will be available to the various national groups and regions. Rather, what is involved is exclusively some new forms of redistribution.

The economic pact involves some additional problems. The money of the Fund can only be used as investment, that is, to create something new, but it cannot be used for maintenance--for example, for outlays to cover the cost of necessary personnel.

"Let us suppose that the Interterritorial Compensation Fund should decide to build a hospital in Carmona. The money to build the hospital would come out of the Fund. The hospital is completed. But for the hospital to function it requires personnel, a series of current expenditures that are fairly steep. Where would this money come from? I believe that the inhabitants of Carmona or any Andalusian may think that the money would come from the Fund. Yet, this cannot be because, according to the Financing Law (LOFCA), money from the Fund can only be used for new investments, not for current expenditures. Any Andalusian citizen may then think: Well then, let the government pay for it from some other fund. When we were planning this the answer of Jaime Garcia Anoveros, minister of finance, was not necessarily that the state was prepared to pay for this. Rather, he said that the autonomous communities should increase their taxes and pay current expenses from that point on."

Its Implementation Will Be Difficult

There is another set of issues which have remained somewhat ambiguous in the signed agreements, such as the fate of investments under way or which have been agreed upon by the government and by members of Cortes or the autonomous communities. Since this issue is not faced squarely, it could happen that some problems will continue--through the Fund--whereas others will disappear.

These are not the only problems that remain. The issue of the election of the deputations as agreed upon assumes in fact a majority system. However, the principal problems are in the agreement itself. The resolve of the government and the PSOE to sign the pact alone, despite its scope, transforms it into a giant with clay feet.

The opposition of the Catalanian and Basque political forces, the conflicts foreseeable in the future between the Socialists and Calvo Sotelo--for example, regarding the question of NATO--can cause a substantial change in the agreement on autonomies. The passage by the Cortes of the various laws that make it up will involve a veritable trial by fire for an agreement that is ill-conceived and badly implemented.

Correction

In our last issue an error transpired in the PCE's communique regarding the number of autonomous communities that had been agreed upon. The number is 16 rather than 17 as represented there.

ROMANIAN EDUCATION MINISTER REPORTS ON FOREIGN STUDENTS

Athens EPIKAIRA in Greek 9-15 Jul 81 p 58

[Article by Ilias Malatos]

[Text] "The 3,000 Greek students who are taking courses at advanced educational institutions in Romania are serious, studious, and do not create problems." These complimentary words--which our students, whether here or in foreign countries, are not very accustomed to hearing--were spoken by the most competent of lips; by the Romanian Minister of Education Aneta Spornic, who has come to our country on an invitation by the Greek government.

Mrs Spornic is a leading figure in her country. A professor of economics and political sciences, today she is a member of the Politburo of the Romanian Communist party. She is a widow and has one son, 15 years old, who is studying electronics. She is president of the Association of Women in Bucharest and has been a deputy for 10 years. She was vice-president of the parliament until she became a minister. Before assuming her post at the Ministry of Education, she was deputy minister of labor. In addition she has been president of the Academy of Political and Economic Sciences. She has written many scientific books such as on property, on labor, and so forth.

Always smiling, she captivates her interlocutor, and with her mental agility she knows how to repudiate but also how to respond persuasively and to defend what she believes in--a sign of her extensive education and also of her experience in life.

On the chief demand of the students for two more chances--examination periods--the Romanian minister answered in the negative. She stressed simply that the student who fails a course in February or June can repeat it in September. And as long as he has failed only one course, he can take the examination once again before a committee of professors, in the same month of September.

It should be noted that the students in Romania take examinations in February for semester courses and in June for semester and year courses. For example, the medical students in their third year had five courses to be examined on in June. If they failed four courses, they would remain in the same year. If they failed three courses they could repeat them in September, at which time if they failed two, then they failed the year as well. If they have only one course left to pass in, then they can take an examination once more before a committee. And if once again they fail this, then they remain in the same year and repeat all the courses.

"We want to guarantee to your children, as well as to our own children, a high-level education. Through both theory and practical training we want to prepare them for the profession which they will be following. Some 30 percent of our educational program consists of practical training. Thus, the student is given the opportunity to understand his discipline more readily." These were the points stressed to us by Mrs Spornic.

She spoke to us also in detail about the educational program of Romania and stressed that even when sitting at the desks of the gymnasium, the young person is being prepared already for what he wants, for what he can become. The State provides him with all the means for a free education. At this moment, 60 percent of all Romanian students have scholarships. This percentage had been even higher formerly, but recently the number of Romanian students has increased considerably.

She emphasized to us that in the advanced educational institutions, the 22,000 foreign students--from various countries, and consequently also Greeks--are not treated any differently from their Romanian colleagues in any way.

"We try to ensure exactly the same educational level to the foreign students as to the Romanian students," she said to us.

To our observation that there always exists some distinction because the Romanian student studies in his native tongue, Mrs Spornic replied that for this reason the foreign students have the preparatory year of university studies, where the young student also studies in the Romanian language the terminology of the discipline which he will be pursuing.

As for the extramural activities of our students, the Romanian minister of education spoke in flattering terms but stressed that the foreign students should not transfer to Romania their political convictions. "It is not permitted," she said to us, "for the students to try to work out their own political problems on foreign soil. We do not impose our own way of life on the foreign students. Therefore these foreign guests are free to attend to their religious functions and to have their own national holidays. We respect the political convictions of every person. Just as the foreign students do not want to have their peace disturbed, in the same way these must not spoil the peace of the others."

Moreover, she told us that complete medical and pharmaceutical care is given to all students, and that they have available to them special clinics in case they become ill. "Beyond these, we also have," she stressed, "special hospital centers with renowned professors for the purpose of specialist training in medicine."

At this point it should be emphasized that in the talks which she had with Greek authorities, the Romanian minister of education agreed with the idea of an exchange of visits by professors between the two countries.

The visit to Greece by Mrs Spornic, who was accompanied by A. (Sanislav), general director for advanced education in her ministry, will be helpful to Greek students who are studying in Romania.

CONFUSION AT TOP BLAMED FOR SLOWING DOWN SPACE PROGRAM

Rome AVIAZIONE in Italian Jul-Aug 81 pp 479-482

[Article by Igino Coggi: "How Not To Make a National Space Plan Take Off"]

[Text] The Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning (CIPE) approved the national medium-term 1979-1983 space plan on 25 October 1979, under the chairmanship of the then minister of Budget, [Economic Planning and Regional Affairs], the Christian Democrat Andreatta. Expenditure forecasts amounted to 200 billion lire to be distributed in 98 billion in the 1979-1981 period and 102 billion for the 1981-1983 period, with updating of the plan in accordance with the results of the 3-year period and distribution of funds for subsequent activities. "When I came into the ministry, I found this plan at a standstill for over 2 years, awaiting approval by the CIPE," the former secretary of CISL [Italian Confederation of Labor Unions], Vito Scalia, elevated to the rank of minister for Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research, stated to a group of scientific journalists on a study tour of Agusta at Cascina Costa, at the end of autumn 1979.

"I acted to have it approved as soon as possible, otherwise it would have become obsolete and would have risked being born outdated," Scalia went on to say, commenting on the plan. "CIPE listened to me, even raising the figure of 178 billion lire established in May 1977 to 200 billion to compensate for inflation." The Christian Democrat Scalia appeared, at that time, so full of good will and so "aggressive" in presenting his arguments that one of the newsmen present wished that he would stay in office at least until the end of the plan. The reply was approximately that ministers change, but that plans must stay. Precisely, there was a change of "chairs" in the ministry and Pierluigi Romita, a social democrat, replaced the former CISL secretary. The minister changed but the plan remained. At the time at which we are writing, another government crisis is risking leading to another change of minister, but the plan should stay. Naturally, it is to remain at a standstill, if it proceeds at the speed at which it has moved up to now, which is the speed of a stone. Not because of Scalia's ill will and not because of Romita's ill will. Because "space is a microcosmos in which the country's problems are reflected," Engineer Ugo Sacerdote, of the AERITALIA space activities group, remarked, pointing out how the lack of decision-making capability on the political level affects not only this activity but also all the nation's activities.

The following is read at Point 4 on the list of sectors provided for by the national space plan: "Programs for telecommunications: the plan provides for production of a preoperational satellite for sophisticated telecommunications in the 20-30

gigahertz frequency range (...)." Note: in a nutshell, that Italsat in which the Italian space plan has been identified, is a satellite that, if achieved in a useful time, might give Italy a very valuable technical supremacy, because the sector of 20-30 gigahertz is a sector in which the others either have not entered or that they are approaching only now, like the Germans. But how far along is this Italsat? "The Italsat is only a fetus," the director of the space division of one of the Italian firms directly involved in the new venture pronounced, making perhaps only a casual reference to Law 194.

Viewed from the outside, it is a disconcertingly simple matter. Everything is there: program, industries, money. Only one small thing is missing: someone to manage the program. That is all. But it is a "that is all" that risks making the plan and projects fail, because, if delays continue to pile up on a program that was approved already with 10 to 12 months delay, the risk is run of making any effort useless. And the government crisis in progress at the time of writing certainly does not make it possible to have rosy hopes. Already on that 25 October 1979 on which the CIPE approved the national space plan, it was "recommended" that the minister for Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research should submit to CIPE itself "operational proposals for management of the aforesaid plan." At that time, Scalia was to say that one of his primary objectives was the establishment of an agency for coordinating Italian space activities both nationally and internationally and that his associates had already been charged with studying the statutes of the French CNES [National Center for Space Studies] and of the similar organization in West Germany. "I believe," Scalia said, "that this kind of agency is indispensable. I think that it should be 51 percent publicly controlled and the rest formed by private industry." Naturally, nothing was done about it.

On 17 January 1980, CIPE requested the National Research Council to manage the plan, but that management was to be "completely transitory" and the CIPE resolution in this connection added: "structural, organizational and regulatory insufficiencies and inadequacies making it difficult for the CNR [National Research Council] to perform tasks requiring prompt decision and rapid implementation, capability of drawing up, assigning and supervising contracts, complicated by content and different execution practices pertaining to supplies for carrying out space programs, have already been observed." Therefore, in the opinion of CIPE, it was "indispensable for the transitory phase ... to be short and to have a term that will represent for the government a corresponding commitment and that, in order not to invalidate the times for implementing the PSN [National Space Plan], will expire, at any rate, by 31 December 1980." In the opinion of CIPE, management of the plan was to have been entrusted to another agency or general directorate, as of New Year's Day 1981, under "a ministry for scientific and technological research to be established" or, if it is believed that the establishment of a new ministry in such a short time is not very realistic, then an agency established by means of transferring to the space sector everything made possible by Law Number 259, of 5 May 1976, authorizing the IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute] to set up a corporation for executing applied research programs in the sector of propulsion and shipbuilding with public fund financing. And this should be within the framework of "other possible approaches already tested and operating in our institutional system."

The year 1980 died, taking with it both the idea of the ad hoc ministry and the idea of the corporation mentioned above. Two days before the first of the year,

on 29 December 1980, the minister for Budget and Economic Planning, Giorgio La Malfa, a member of the Italian Republican Party], in his capacity also as vice chairman of CIPE, signed the following resolution, "after hearing the report by the minister for Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research" (Pierluigi Romita): "The CNR will continue to administer the national space plan temporarily, in the understanding that by 31 December 1981 the minister for Coordination of Scientific and Technological Research will submit concrete operational proposals to the committee." The government crisis at the end of May, however, is giving rise to serious doubts on the possibility that "concrete operational proposals" can be submitted to CIPE by the specified date. This is not at all felicitous.

The crux of the matter is that the lack of an active top-level guide is blocking allocation of funds already appropriated. And the whole thing is stranded, if funds are not allocated. If it is borne in mind that the first contracts provided by a project launched in 1979 were awarded only this year, it will be realized how a national plan risks seeing its own objectives made useless, if it is not implemented in time. The validity of the objectives is limited in time, insofar as these objectives will be valid only if they are attained with an adequate advance margin. Otherwise it is entirely useless to embark on an undertaking with the risk of completing it precisely when these same objectives have already been successfully pursued by someone who moved later. The team of industries involved, from CNS [expansion unknown] to Selenia, from AERITALIA to Defense and Space itself, are in a stalemate position, while the great danger, emphasized somewhat by all, is that the funds already appropriated will be dispersed in a thousand small streams. In fact, requests are already appearing for small slices or for studies using funds intended for the plan and with 50 million lire one day, 100 million the next day there is the risk of using it all up very soon.

The risk of stranding and losses through delays is threatening practically every item in the plan. For example, the Italian Government has already reserved a flight on the American space shuttle in September 1985, but we also risk losing this initial "departure" with the danger of making all the other possibilities for using the same space shuttle slip away. And the Americans certainly are not waiting for us. The delay accumulating on the Italsat is serious. Production of this satellite--possibly in body stabilized or spin stabilized configuration--would open up to our country the possibility of selling complete satellite systems, thus reversing a situation that has always seen Italy, with the exception of the Sirio-2, in a minority position with participations never exceeding 30 percent in the international field. Sirio-1 served rather well for laying the groundwork for development of a policy of satellite productions for which the national space plan would be the logical market. Moreover, the Italsat might be introduced as an intermediate phase toward production of smaller satellites available for sale to the Third World, a market in process of formation that will have to be watched carefully in the coming years.

Delaying Italsat means threatening this program with technological devaluation, making it outdated at the very time of its completion. And the danger is not unreal. In order to be effective, the commercial operation should start no later than 1990, but, in order to achieve that, a preoperational satellite is needed, precisely the one mentioned in the national space plan. In order to stay within the time limits, the Italsat must be launched in 1986. This means having the satellite ready no later than 1985. But the 1986 launching date is regarded by many

as entirely utopian, in view of the delays with which it is proceeding and bearing in mind that only Phase A was started in 1981, while Phase B should start no later than next September, in order to start Phases C and D in 1982, at the latest. There are doubts, even many doubts, that these times can be met. This is serious, if it is realized that by using a satellite derived from the Italsat, but provided the preoperational satellite is launched in 1986, Italy could play an effective card in space commercialization. Technically the capability for doing it is there. What is lacking is a decision-making authority that will make one single, effective, active person responsible for managing the national space policy and who can also act as a completely respected spokesman in matters of international cooperation. With the new government crisis, the risk of a further, ruinous postponement is unfortunately a shadow that is anything but transparent.

Financial Planning of the Space Plan
(in billion lire as of 1 May 1977)

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Totale
- Ricerca di Base scientifica e tecnologica (1)	4	4	4			
- CRA e Base Kenia (2)	3	3	3			
- Programma Spacelab-Carichi utili (3)	1	3	3			
- Nuovo Programma TLC (Satellite + Lanciatore S.S.)	13	16	21			
- Sistemi e strutture a terra (4)	2					
- Telerilevamento (5)	2	2	2			
- Propulsione e mezzi ausiliari (6)	2	2	3			
- Studi di fattibilità per realizzazione speciali future di tipo avanzato (7)	1	3	3			
Totale	28	33	38			200

98

102

The sectors in which the national space plan is arranged with the pertinent spending distributions.
Key: 1. basic scientific and technological research; 2. CRA and Kenya Base; 3. Spacelab programma--payloads; 4. New TLC [expansion unknown] program (satellite and launcher system and structures), ground systems and structures; 5. remote surveying; 6. propulsion and auxiliary equipment; 7. feasibility studies for future space achievements of a sophisticated type.

10,042

CSO: 3104/356

PRESENT, FUTURE OF SOLID PROPELLANT INDUSTRY

Rome RIVISTA AERONAUTICA in Italian Jul-Aug 81 pp 64-70

[Article by Paolo Laurienzo: "Jet Propulsion in Italy"]

[Excerpts] Jet Propulsion in Italy

Italian activities in the field of rocket propulsion so far had been confined in the industrial area to solid propellants. Some industrial attempts have been made toward the application of hydrazine propulsion in space travel for satellite attitude control but the extremely limited commercial prospects of these applications do not permit the relatively heavy investments necessary to attain competitive status at least on the European level. Industry has always been engaged in some sort of studies on hybrid propellants, which were abandoned for the reasons given earlier, and on electrical propulsion; the latter was considered by SNIA Viscosa in a general exploratory study which on the one hand made it possible to get an idea of the development efforts and the investments necessary and, on the other hand, the limitations and the specific nature of practical fields of application (planetary missions); here again, Italian dimensions did not permit any further in-depth development. Viceversa, still in the electric propulsion field, magneto-plasma-dynamic propulsion looks worthwhile today; it presents a greater thrust compared to ions and hence opens up prospects for employment in the orbital transfer of large bodies. Finally we must mention the research activities conducted by several Italian universities on liquid, hybrid, and "air-breathing" propellants.

Why this interest in solid fuels? At the end of World War II, the ammunition industry in Italy was already 40 years old and consequently had experience in the field of explosives used for launching purposes. This knowledge was used after the war in "off-shore" orders assigned by the United States to European industrial establishments in connection with production of war materiel necessary to reconstitute the defensive base of the Atlantic Alliance. The technical cooperation, deriving from that, in Italy likewise helped develop a group of men with basic training that enabled them with decreasing timidity to look toward the new American achievements. In the meantime, the United States kept developing rocket and missile activities and this led to the production and massive use of small air-to-ground rockets, such as the famous 2.75" Mighty-Mouse.

At the time they were owned by Bombrini Parodi-Delfino, the Collegerro establishments began to use the knowledge and production equipment needed for launch explosives in order to learn how to reproduce the propellant substance of the

Mighty-Mouse. Parallel to that, we began to think of an entirely Italian product and these initial efforts produced the 2" air-to-ground rocket which afterward proved to have tremendous operational value and which is still quite popular on the market. It should be noted that many original solutions were introduced in that product (such as the rudder assembly, still protected by patent, and the engine cowling production cycle); the pertinent production line was so set up as to produce all components of the rocket in the Colleferro workshops, starting with the raw material. This complete and self-sufficient vertical setup is an almost unique characteristic of the Colleferro establishments which on various occasions enabled SNIA to be in a superior position on the market.

This brings us to the beginning of the sixties. The need for sophistication in armaments grew also in Italy and NATO began to look toward the adoption of missile systems. While the first steps had been taken for several years in Europe (and rather timidly also in Italy) to acquire an autonomous design and development capacity for new systems, the first programs for production, in Europe, based on American licenses, were drafted due to the impetus from operational requirement which could not await the long-drawn-out and laborious research effort. Italy subscribed to the Hawk program and that in turn provided knowledge on compound propellants.

Later on we will see through what experiences--starting with the historical background outlined earlier--SNIA achieved the role which it plays today in the solid fuel field, both double-base and composite. It seems a good idea to me to dwell now a little bit on the question, that is: why only solid propellants in Italy? The basic answer answer to this question, I believe, should be found in the rather clear separation between the fields of application of solid and liquid propellants and the subsequent priority destination of liquid fuels for the big space vehicles.

The enormous investments necessary to develop and produce liquid-fuel jet engines can be justified only if they are supported by broad-range practical application programs. Programs of that kind initially were established in the United States, both in space and in the military field, after which efforts were concentrated in the search for solutions to propulsion problems deriving from the planned conquest of space. In Italy, on the one hand, we never established a requirement for having a long-range missile because, in contrast to the institutional missions of the armed forces, space policy on the other hand was always pursued at the tail end of the European effort, also for reasons on budget limitations. It was therefore impossible to create the minimum conditions necessary for an industrial takeoff in the field of liquid propulsion. Without this foundation, it was not even possible to pursue less ambitious goals in this sector, such as to be able at least to reproduce relatively small engines, with storable liquid fuels, for military applications. Concerning SNIA itself, it repeatedly and on various occasions examined the possibility of acquiring the basic technologies and the necessary production plants; but the conclusion was negative each time because the analysis of nonrecurrent costs and their amortization always turned out negative. This negative attitude was recently modified, on the one hand, in relation to the established possibility of decisively assisting in the study of the system and in integration activities as well as propulsion system tests using liquid fuel, although without any production of components, and, on the other hand, the growing importance of these systems in orbital transfer activities resulting from the advent of the American Space Shuttle.

In the context of the above-mentioned motivations, which brought about the present situation in Italy in the field of jet propulsion, I consider it useful, for better understanding, to touch on the European situation and particularly on the British, French, and German situations. In the field of advanced weapons systems, Great Britain and France started off rather at an advantage after the war by virtue of their role as victorious countries, while Germany had to overcome the handicap of the peace treaty during a second phase at a cost of massive investments in research which were made possible by the German economic miracle, which was much more powerful and much more long-lasting than the Italian one.

Following in the wake of American research, the British were the first to get going, aided by a historically privileged relationship with the United States and by an investment policy which was not yet irreparably influenced by the breakup of the British Empire; on this basis, the United Kingdom right away expressed its space pursuits with considerable developments also in jet propulsion using liquid fuel. France had to wait for the maturing of Gaullism, the Europe of the fatherlands and the "strategic striking force" before any major developments were launched in the field of space technology and hence in jet propulsion. Parallel to that, Germany--held down, as we said before, by the severe restrictions imposed by the peace treaty--was able only to get ready to grab an opportunity to get back into the swing of things in a manner not directly connected with military developments. That opportunity came with the launching of the European space effort; the three countries were ready when the moment came, although each of them had gone through different experiences; they were ready to make the best possible use of the knowledge derived from space developments. In particular, Great Britain contributed to the first propulsion stage, in the development of the Europa rocket booster, with its own Blue Streak, while France and Germany worked on the perfection of the second and third stages, which were to use liquid fuels. Research and development on liquid-fuel jet engines were then continued in France and Germany which are today perfecting the propulsion stages for Ariane, in whose third stage cryogenic fuel technologies will for the first time be applied in Europe.

For the reasons given earlier, liquid propulsion is now firmly entrenched in France and Germany while Italy stuck with the first-generation technologies. Here, greater attention was devoted to double-base solid fuels, developed extensively in collaboration with the American Hercules; in the field of composite fuels, on the other hand, where it wanted to develop its own competence, Great Britain practically concentrated entirely on attempts at using fuels with poly-isobutylene which, being plastic, did not present specifically defined mechanical characteristics and would therefore be extremely difficult to use. All solid fuels also experienced broad development in France on the basis of the military programs drawn up as part of the "strategic strike force" and complete autonomy within NATO. Although it tried to overcome the initial handicap in the solid fuel sector, Germany in the end managed to establish regular production efforts only in the form of double-base fuels, likewise of the not advanced type, while regarding composite fuels it concentrated on prototype applications, remaining dependent however on France and Italy for all solid fuels.

Solid Fuels

I said earlier that only solid fuels were developed in Italy on an industrial scale. It seems to me that the time has come to take another look at the word "only" here. Solid fuels as matter of fact involve such a variety of technologies and entail such a tremendous volume of know-how that it is extremely rare to find production capacities for all of the various specialties in this sector combined in just one industrial complex. Without attempting a systematic classification, I consider it useful to list the various categories of solid fuels for the purpose of suggesting a specific idea as to the entire complex of the subject matter taken up here in this production area.

First of all, let us take a look at the morphological, technological, and basic application differences between the two major families of solid fuels: the double-base fuels and the composite fuels. The former are essentially made up of two chemical compounds (bases), both of them with the double function of fuel and oxydant: nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine. The intimate physical interconnection of the two components, in proportions that vary according to the techniques adopted, is intended to produce the correct stoichiometric ration between fuel and oxydant, the necessary mechanical characteristics, and the highest possible energy content. The basic characteristic of the double-base fuels in terms of practical application is the absence of primary smoke in the combustion products, which however is normally obtained at the price of a relatively low energy content and mechanical characteristics which are definitely inferior in relation to certain uses. All composite fuels are characterized by chemical separation between oxydant and fuel. The oxydant function is normally performed by an ammonia salt with a high oxygen content; the fuel function is normally entrusted to two different components: aluminum powder, which is indispensable in increasing the energy content of the fuel and in guaranteeing stability in combustion, and the organic polymer which also acts as a bonding agent for the mixture. Fundamental practical application characteristics of composite fuels include castability [screenability], which renders them adaptable to the most diverse forms of coverings, and the high mechanical and energy properties which can be attained, the latter achieved at the price of a heavy production of primary smoke.

Double-base propellants in turn can be subdivided, as a function of the manufacturing technology, into "extruded" and "cast"; double-base cast fuels must be more correctly defined as "adsorbed" [soaked] since the mixture of the two bases is accomplished through the soaking of nitrocellulose by nitroglycerine. Extruded propellants are obtained through extrusion with a press and therefore are suitable for large-series production but at the same time they are limited in terms of diameter by the capacity of the presses which cannot be increased infinitely, also considering the safety problems springing from this type of processing (a correct limit for the diameter can be considered 150 mm). Likewise directly connected with the type of processing, we have the usability of extruded grains only in a cylindrical form, except for minor adaptations of the terminal surfaces obtained from mechanical processing after extrusion. Besides, although theoretically possible, we would not advise the use of extruded grains in assemblies different from "free-standing" in relation to the major problems of adhesion to the envelope resulting from that. Finally we must disclose a last, distinctive characteristic among the two double-base families deriving from the processing method: the

extrusion process permits the insertion, into the propellant, of a larger percentage of nitroglycerine, with a subsequently greater energy content as compared to the cast fuels.

It follows from the above quite clearly that the double-base cast fuels are used in those applications in which it is indispensable, for tactical reasons, to eliminate any primary smoke in engines with a diameter greater than the extrusion limit. This employment motivation, which is always timely, has led to the study of new techniques in order to make the double-base cast fuels more powerful; this has brought us a new fuel family, defined in overall terms as "double-base boosted" fuels. In effect, only a single class of these fuels can be correctly considered to be of the double-base type: in them as a matter of fact we only increase the percentage of nitroglycerine until we get energy characteristics of the same order of magnitude as in the double-base extruded fuels. The other boosted fuels result from the inclusion--in the mixture of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin--of diverse materials with a high energy content. Among these types we can distinguish another two classes of fuels: the "double-base composite fuels" and the "double-base fuels with explosive." The former are obtained by adding powdered aluminum and ammonium perchlorate to the two bases; with these additions, we get energy yields comparable to those deriving from a separate composite propellant but we get the production of primary smoke (due to the presence of aluminum) and secondary smoke (deriving from the condensation of hydrochloric acid produced by perchlorate). The addition of explosives to the double-base mixture is the only thing that enables us to obtain energy characteristics which are even higher than those of the best compound fuels, without any smoke generation; engines made with this technique however, apart from the difficulty and danger involved in processing, present one defect which considerably limits their field of application: they can easily explode due to the action of projectiles or splinters.

Composite fuels therefore so far have held a preponderant role in missile applications; the dimensions, the yields, and the easy handling required cannot be obtained otherwise so long as we remain in the field of jet propulsion properly speaking. Composite fuels likewise represent a big family made up of classes and varied species. Their classification is fundamentally based on the organic polymer used as fuel and as bonding agent; we have composite propellants with plastisol (with a PVC bonding agent; they have not found any major use due to their efficient mechanical characteristics), polyurethane, and polybutadiene. Polybutadiene in turn can consist of random carboxyls (PBAA, likewise revealing poor mechanical characteristics and therefore of little or no use), terminal carboxyls (CTPB, by far the class that is most widespread), and terminal oxydrils (HTPB, the latest to be in wide use). Without further dwelling on a detailed listing of the chemical-physical differences and therefore the application differences of real polymers, I would like to stress the fact that HTPB, compared to CTPB, is based on the use of a more economical polymer which permits the inclusion of a greater percentage of solids in the propellant, with a subsequent increase in the energy characteristics, which however is obtained at the price of a decline in the mechanical characteristics sometimes not acceptable in relation to the employment requirements.

As far as the oxidant is concerned, the salt almost generally used in composite propellants is ammonium perchlorate. In some applications--especially when we want to get lower combustion temperatures (as in the case of gas generators)--we use

ammonium nitrate. In the United States, propellants have also been made with nitroformium [as published] but their use is not yet widespread and the pertinent technologies are not yet known in Europe.

The third fundamental component of composite fuels--powdered aluminum--is finally added always, as we said before, to increase the energy content. In this field likewise however we have run into the problem of making fuels without smoke and an attempt has been made to eliminate aluminum which causes the primary smoke. The absolute absence of aluminum however renders combustion unstable and it was therefore necessary to limit the percentage to the minimum (around 2 percent), getting the so-called "low-smoke" fuels which furthermore always entail the generation of a secondary smoke because of the condensation of the hydrochloric acid. To get "smokeless" composite fuels, it was necessary to work toward completely different formulations, such as the compounds based on the use of nitroformium.

Principal Programs Carried Out in Italy and Prospects

With very few exceptions, all of the solid propellants briefly listed in the preceding paragraph are produced in Italy and are comparable to the best in the world on all qualitative levels. This statement, which is supported by technical and commercial successes in the field, might make us think about the tremendous scope of research and investment efforts made by the industry in this branch in Italy.

It should be disclosed that when we in Italy speak of the propellant industry, we actually mean Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. [Incorporated]. For this particular situation we likewise have historical and technical reasons which we might bring out at this point. SNIA Viscosa, the leading Italian industry group in the field of textile fibers and chemical products, developed production capacities in the military and base sectors only in 1968 with the takeover of Bombrini Parodi-Delfino. From the technical and industrial viewpoint, this merger however did not result in any break in the continuity in activities carried out in this sector in the establishments of BPD [Bombrini Parodi-Delfino] at Colleferro and Ceccano.

The present experience of Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. thus has its roots far back in 1912, when Colleferro started the production of dynamite, at first, and then ammunition; as a result of events during the two world wars, it remained and still is the main production activity. In this field, investments made over many decades by BPD gave it a dominant position in Italy already right after World War II. On top of the tremendous experience in launch explosives thus acquired we quite naturally now have, as we said earlier, the development and production activities, first of all, regarding double-base propellants and then composite propellants. The level attained today by Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. in these activities however has not been the result only of the normal development of a favorable solution but also of a very specific decision to specialize which was made several years ago. In view of the growing investment commitments in terms of men and resources required by these activities for defense and space, it was decided to concentrate efforts in the field of explosives, solid propellants, and their applications, dropping system activities in the missile field which were pursued for about a decade, likewise with significant technical results. This decision in less than 10 years enabled Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. to achieve a primary role which, in some respects, is unique in Europe in the field of solid-fuel jet propulsion.

With the basic prerequisites in terms of production capacity and past experience, as outlined earlier, the prospects should be viewed in the best possible light. The world market situation reveals aspects of great dynamism which, in a normal economic system, are bound to lead to worthwhile industrial achievements over the next several years.

These possible openings in the specific sector of jet propulsion however are threatened by general factors which cannot be controlled on the industrial level. For the deep crisis in which we live now above all increasingly restricts the public funds earmarked for research and the investments necessary to keep pace in this sector are becoming ever more problematical. The level of competitive capability must be defended day after day against the rapid obsolescence of technologies and the aggressive competition from industries operating in economically stronger countries. We cannot think in terms of organizing this defense only on the basis of industrial in-house financing which nevertheless has been accomplished massively in recent years. If the government, pressed by the urgency of a general and rapidly deteriorating situation, should have to drop an organic research policy also in the space and defense fields, then the present-day promising prospects would gradually shrink and we would thus have taken a further step toward underdevelopment.

Beyond these general considerations, it is possible to foresee the development outlines to be pursued in order to keep the engine industry on the level of competitiveness achieved. In addition to the routine work involved in coming up with new formulas in the composite propellant field, a tremendous improvement effort yet remains to be accomplished on boosted double-based propellants. But this effort does not offer any new ways of employment; it only serves to enlarge the range of utilization requirements which can be met with solid-fuel jet engines. A jump in employment and technologies however is connected with the development of propellants with extremely high combustion speed which open up new horizons to all those applications which demand the achievement of high muzzle velocities with low launch weight.

Along this same line of specialization in the propellant industry--although beyond the field of jet propulsion as such--we come to "air-breathing" which is already replacing jet propulsion in long-range Sea-Skimmer missiles and, as I said earlier, which will replace solid-fuel propulsion in very many long-range missile applications. In this field likewise it is absolutely necessary and technically possible in Italy likewise very quickly to start practical application developments so as to try to gain at least some of the ground lost on the European level.

In space, it is possible to say that the technologies used in engines currently being developed cannot be further perfected. There are however, major prospects for product diversification. The space propulsion systems which Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. can put together range from apogee motors to boosters for space vehicles, to orbiting systems used from the Space Shuttle, to missiles such as the Scout and the Diamant BP4. In this field we have already specifically ascertained international interest both in boosters and in the Ariane missile, both regarding the external propulsion stage and the Space Shuttle. The possibility of implementing these programs once again depends on the political determination to move along certain development lines.

Resources and Manpower

I should now provide a framework of resources which SNIA, first of all, and then also Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. progressively had to obtain for themselves in order to reach the specialization level they have attained now. But that would only give us a dry listing many pages long; or we should devote an entire article to this aspect. I believe that it would be better to confine ourselves to indicating some essential elements which would give us an idea of the entire complex of efforts made in this direction.

Regarding manufacturing plants, instruments, and control equipment, as well as testing facilities and instruments Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. invested several scores of billions. At the Test Center alone we have three specific plants, which are among the best in the world and which do not exist in any other organization in Europe. Here we have an x-ray plant equipped with a linear 8-MeV accelerator capable of x-raying engines with a diameter of up to 2 m; a vibration plant equipped with the most powerful vibrating table on the market (30,000 pound-force, sinusoidal); a static engine test stand with altitude simulation, capable of maintaining a pressure of 8-10 mm Hg for a duration of up to 60-90 sec of combustion. A second plant of this type, but for engines with a propellant of up to 2,000 kg, is now being completed; a new plant for static tests in the atmosphere, for big engines, such as the Ariane boosters, is also being prepared.

Another aspect of the experience acquired here seems to me worth disclosing here; it involves the scope and variety of the software assets developed through the acquisition of basic programs from third countries and their adjustment to specific requirements, as well as through a decade of activities of preparing special mathematical models. The main object of this software includes combustion chemistry, flow-dynamics, heat analysis, structural analysis (in an elastic viscoelastic setting), aerodynamics, external ballistics.

To manage this hardware and software inventory we need highly specialized technicians working in the individual activity sectors. In order, as I said in the beginning, to obtain the experts who plan to go into jet propulsion, it seems necessary to me to provide some more detailed information on that score so as to give them some indications for guidance in their professional training. The Study and Research Group, Difesa e Spazio S.p.A., currently has 350 personnel on its staff; half of these people are on the specialized technical level and are college graduates. Here are the main fields of specialization represented in the group:

Design: structures, internal ballistics, aerodynamics and external ballistics, operations research, systems studies;

Manufacturing: mechanical, composite materials technologies, chemistry and physics;

Control: reliability, quality, configuration;

Testing: physical, electronics, instruments;

Management: program chiefs.

It has been possible to recruit some people on the labor market who are already trained in these special fields. We can say however that basic training must necessarily be combined with specific training in industry; we wish it were possible to give this kind of training within one semester--but that is not possible.

By saying this I do not want to blame the schools directly for the situation which goes beyond other shortcomings of a general nature which everybody deplores and which certainly cannot be controlled by those who run our schools. On the other hand, I consider it necessary to evidence the chronic insufficiency of connections between schools and industry. This is why we must, I believe, do everything possible to close this gap.

With this view in mind, the Directorate of the Aerospace Propulsion Institute of the University of Rome has organized a series of seminars on jet propulsion. I hope that some direct advantage in terms of information may spring from this initiative. But above all I hope this will only be the first in a series of contacts between the schools and industry which will help reduce the existing gap and--why not--also eliminate some lack of understanding which in the past has resulted in sometimes bitter competition between the officials responsible for these two branches, both of which are fundamental and indispensable when it comes to mounting a serious and continuous effort to achieve scientific and technological progress.

Most Important Achievements of Difesa E Spazio S.p.A. (Formerly SNIA Viscosa)

Development of Rockets and Engines for Missiles

2" air-to-ground rocket (double-base extruded motor).

SNORA 80-mm air-ground-rocket (developed in collaboration with Swiss Oerlikon; double-base extruded motor).

Multipurpose 105-mm rocket (for use from ships for passive anti-missile counter-measures; three different engines, double-base extruded).

Field saturation weapons system, FIROS 25 (using a 120-mm rocket; double-base extruded motor).

Engine for Aspide air-to-air missile (propellant using polybutadiene with terminal carboxyls).

Engine for surface-to-air missile (propellant with polybutadiene and terminal oxydrils).

Engine for Indigo missile (development in progress: double-based boosted, cast-type propellant).

Development of Space Transport Engines and Systems

Prototype probe rockets, varied dimensions and performance.

PAS apogee engine (for experimental launches with Europa II rocket, not performed; motor checked out on ground; total weight 189 kg; 153 kg polyurethane propellant; specific impulse in vacuum 275 sec).

Sirio apogee motor (for Italian experimental telecommunications satellites launched on 25 August 1977; total engine weight 203 kg; 177 kg polybutadiene propellant; specific impulse in vacuum 286 sec).

GEOS apogee motor (for European scientific satellite launched on 20 April 1977; engine developed in collaboration with French SEP; total weight 305 kg; propellant with polybutadiene, 270 kg; specific impulse in vacuum 287 sec).

MAGE 1 apogee motor (for satellite in Meteosat class; engine developed in collaboration with French SEP and German MAN, being checked out; total weight 350 kg; 321 kg propellant with polybutadiene; specific impulse in vacuum 293 sec).

MAGE 2 apogee motor (for satellites of the ECS and TELECOM class; engine development now in progress in collaboration with French SEP and German MAN; total weight 540 kg; 500 kg polybutadiene propellant; specific impulse in vacuum 295 sec).

Separation rockets for Ariane booster (three different types; retrorockets for slow down of first and second stages; accelerators for second stage; accelerators for third stage; checkout completed; production of flight units now in progress).

Two-stage Alfa experimental booster (flight-tested successfully in three launches with only first stage active; principal first-stage engine characteristics: total weight 5,950 kg; propellant weight 6,050 kg; total thrust 1,350,000 kg/sec).

Boosters for Ariane 3 rocket (two boosters increase the payload capacity in transfer orbit of Ariane from 1,950 kg to 2,350 kg; main characteristics: 7 m long, diameter 1 m, total weight 8,500 kg, 7,300 kg polybutadiene propellant).

Series Production of Rockets and Missile Engines

2" air-to-ground rocket (ordered by Italian Air Force and foreign customers).

SURA 80-mm air-to-ground rocket (orders from foreign customers).

DIRA 80-mm air-to-ground rocket (orders from foreign clients).

SNORA 80-mm air-to-ground rocket (orders from foreign customers).

Multipurpose 105-mm rocket (orders from navy and foreign customers).

Engines for COBRA AT missile (orders from Italian Army and foreign customers).

Engines for MAMBA AT missile (orders from foreign customers).

JATO rockets, double-base, cast.

Engines for Hawk missile (produced by Aerochemie, associated with SNIA; polyurethane propellant).

Engines for Sparrow missile (produced by Aerochemie, polybutadiene propellant).

Engines for improved Hawk missiles (HELIP program; production in progress at Aerochemie).

Overall, the production effort outlined above resulted in hundreds of thousands of rockets and double-base engines and many thousands of composite-propellant engines coming out of the Colleferro establishment.

(With a degree in mechanical engineering, Engineer Paolo Laurienzo has been a member of the board of directors and an advisor to SICA S.p.A., an employee of SISPRE in Rome as designer, as well as design office head and chief of the prototype and testing division. In 1968 he joined SNIA Viscosa as deputy head and then as chief of the "rockets, missiles, and space programs" sector. Today he is director of research and development at Difesa e Spazio S.p.A. in Rome and a member of CIAS (Interministerial Committee for Space Activities).)

5058

CSO:3104/363

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

16 Sept 1981